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ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS
YingChou Lin 
Old Dominion University, 2007 
Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung
This dissertation investigates two possible sources that contribute to the gains of 
corporate spin-offs. In the first essay, I investigate the relation between the value created 
by corporate spin-offs and the misvaluations of the parent firms and their spun-off 
divisions. I argue that spin-offs could create value even though the efficiency of the firm 
remains unchanged. Corporate spin-offs could be driven by the desire to correct the 
undervaluation of the parent firm or the spun-off unit. Thus, the gains of spin-offs should 
be highly correlated with the degree of misvaluation. By examining a 263 corporate 
spinoffs sample in the period of 1980 - 2006,1 find that parent firms are relatively 
undervalued before the spin-offs, and the undervaluation problem subsides after the 
divestiture. Moreover, the degree of undervaluation of parents is positively correlated 
with the announcement abnormal returns. Surprisingly, I find that the spun-off divisions, 
on average, are highly overvalued before the spin-offs, and such overvaluation turned 
into undervaluation after those divisions become independent entities. Overall, the 
findings indicate that the gains of spin-offs are primarily attributed to the undervaluation 
correction of parent firms, rather than the value created by spun-off divisions.
In the second essay, I investigate whether managers “manage” earnings before 
corporate spin-offs. I argue that managers have incentives to manipulate earnings due to 
either managerial opportunism or managerial optimism. Either motivation could result in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a positive correlation between the level of abnormal accruals and the announcement 
abnormal returns. With a 240 spin-off sample from 1980-2006,1 find that spin-offs firms 
aggressively manage earnings prior to the announcements. The results show that the level 
of abnormal accruals of spin-off parents increases significantly prior to the spin-off and 
becomes insignificant after the spin-off is completed. I also find that pre-spin-off 
abnormal accruals have predictive power of the announcement returns. The finding 
indicates that significant, positive spin-off announcement returns are correlated to the 
pre-spin-off earnings management. In addition, I find a positive relation between the level 
of earnings management and the long-term returns of spin-offs parents, which is 
consistent with the signaling hypothesis prediction. However, the predictive power is not 
statistically significant. A number of explanations regarding the findings are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The determination of size of the firm has been argued in both academic and 
industrial circles for years. In the famous essay “the nature of the firm” (1937), Coase 
stated that the scope of a firm is determined by the transaction costs between a firm and 
the market. He argued that firms “should be integrated when costs of organizing an extra 
transaction within firms become lower than the costs of carrying out the same transaction 
by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm” 
(p394-395). However, when firms get large, there may be decreasing returns due to the 
certain marketing costs and organizational costs, which diminish the efficiency. It implies 
that when the costs of integration are higher than the costs of market transactions, the 
firm should be better off by separating one or more units from this organization. In other 
words, when the economies of scale are unable to deliver a better performance, or when a 
division of a firm no longer fit into the firm’s plan, managers may restructure their 
organizational and ownership structure to enhance their competitive advantage. Since the 
size of the firm could be highly correlated with the cost-benefit of the firm, managers 
could change the scope of the corporation once the size of the firm does not satisfy their 
desire.
Takeovers and restructuring can be viewed as the efforts by managers to achieve 
the optimal scope of firms. In recent years, such developments have continued to 
accelerate dramatically. In 1980 in the U.S, the aggregate deal volume stood at 1,560 
completed deals (including merger and acquisitions (M&As) and divestitures1) and the
1 The definition o f  divestitures is obscure. Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2004) describe divestitures as 
“the sale o f a segment o f a company to another entity.”(p785). Rosenfeld (1984) and Brauer (2006) defined 
divestitures as “a firm’s adjustment o f its ownership and business portfolio via spin-off, equity carve-out, 
split-up or sell-off’. In this paper, we use the latter definition.
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aggregate value of $34.8 billion, as shown in Table 1. The number climbed to 8,853 deals 
and $1.781 trillion of value in the year 2000. In 2005, there were 7,928 deals that 
accounted for aggregate value $980.8 billion, including 4,839 deals with a total $673.1 
billion in M&As, and 2,459 deals with a total of $307.7 billion in divestiture.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Even though faith in the advantage of economies of scale retains a powerful hold 
on many business thinkers, U.S. corporations have started changing the scale-as-endgame 
strategies. In 1980, M&As accounted for almost 85% of the overall deals, or 93% of the 
value of transactions in the changing of the scope of firms (see Tablel and Table 2). By 
2005, however, the divestiture deals and value increased to 33.7% and 31.4%, 
respectively. The downsizing of corporations became a significant strategy for managers 
to restructure their businesses and improve the performance of their firms. During the 
past two decades, some of the world’s most admired public companies have conducted 
such transactions to rebuild their edges.2
[Insert Table 2 here]
Among various techniques of corporate restructuring and reorganization, a 
popular approach of choice for corporations seeking to achieve an appropriate size is the 
spin-off.3 The term “corporate spin-off’ is described as the distribution of all or 
substantially all of the ownership interest of one firm (the parent) in another firm(s) (the 
subsidiary/subsidiaries) on a pro rata basis to the shareholders of the parent company 
(Kudla and Mclnish, 1984; Hite and Owers, 1983). Therefore, following the spin-off
2 For example, in 1983, Warner-Lambert sold its bakery unit, Entenmann’s to General Foods. In 1988, 
DuPont divested its original commercial explosive business. The same year, Xerox sold its last remaining 
insurance unit, Crum & Forster Holdings, Inc., to Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited o f Toronto for $680 
million. In 2007, Tyco spun itself into three businesses: Covidien, Tyco Electronics, and Tyco International.
3 In British, a spin-off is also called breakup.
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there are at least two separate publicly held companies. Shareholders exchange their 
claims on an existing firm for new shares in two or more distinct entities-the original 
parent firm and the newly-separated subsidiaries. For example, on September 20, 1995, 
AT&T corporation announced that it would separate into three public trading, global 
companies. The long-term distance business was still under the AT&T brand name; the 
computer equipment division became Global Info Solutions (now renamed NCR Corp); 
and the equipment segment became Lucent Technologies. In January, 1997, Pepsico Inc. 
announced that it would spin off its KFC, Pizza Hut and Taco Bell restaurant businesses 
as a publicly traded company, Tricon Global Restaurants (YUM). In both cases, the 
distribution of the new companies’ shares is on a pro-rata basis to the original 
shareholders.
In spite of the surge of spin-offs in the U.S. business for releasing shareholder 
value and achieving other business purposes, such transactions have received far less 
attention. It is obvious that there are little incentives for institutional investors to initiate 
coverage of spun-off companies, since these firms cannot make any fees on the 
distribution of new shares to initial shareholders of parent companies. Furthermore, spin­
offs activities are often treated as either “minor images of M&As activities” or “part of 
corporate restructuring rather than an independence, purposeful strategic option for 
corporate renewal” (Brauer, 2006). Last, but not least, the spun-off units are usually not 
included in stocks index therefore institutional holders are reluctant to hold such stocks.4
4 In the article “Finding value in spin-offs”, Dorsey (2003) stated that spin-offs are usually neglected in 
Wall Street due to: (1) no hype, (2) selling pressure of index funds, (3) low analyst coverage and, (4) 
limited track record.
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This purpose of this dissertation is to investigate two possible sources that 
contribute to the gains of corporate spin-offs. In the first essay, I examine the relation 
between the value created by corporate spin-offs and the misvaluations of the parent 
firms and their spun-off divisions. I argue that spin-offs could create value even though 
the efficiency of the firm remains unchanged. Corporate spin-offs could be driven by the 
desire to correct the undervaluation of the parent firm or the spun-off unit. Thus, the 
gains of spin-offs should be highly correlated with the degree of misvaluation. By 
examining a 263 corporate spinoffs sample in the period of 1980 - 2006,1 find that parent 
firms are relatively undervalued before the spin-offs, and the undervaluation problem 
subsides after the divestiture. Moreover, the degree of undervaluation of parents is 
positively correlated with the announcement abnormal returns. Surprisingly, I find that 
the spun-off divisions, on average, are highly overvalued before the spin-offs, and such 
overvaluation turned into undervaluation after those divisions become independent 
entities. Overall, the findings indicate that the gains of spin-offs are primarily attributed 
to the undervaluation correction of parent firms, rather than the value created by spun-off 
divisions.
In the second essay, I investigate whether managers “manage” earnings before 
corporate spin-offs. I argue that managers have incentives to manipulate earnings due to 
either managerial opportunism or managerial optimism. Either motivation could result in 
a positive correlation between the level of abnormal accruals and the announcement 
abnormal returns. With a 240 spin-off sample from 1980-2006,1 find that spin-offs firms 
aggressively manage earnings prior to the announcements. The results show that the level 
of abnormal accruals of spin-off parents increases significantly prior to the spin-off and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
becomes insignificant after the spin-off is completed. I also find that pre-spin-off 
abnormal accruals have predictive power of the announcement returns. The finding 
indicates that significant, positive spin-off announcement returns are correlated to the 
pre-spin-off earnings management. In addition, I find a positive relation between the level 
of earnings management and the long-term returns of spin-offs parents, which is 
consistent with the signaling hypothesis prediction. However, the predictive power is not 
statistically significant. A number of explanations regarding the findings are discussed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ESSAY 1 
MISVALUATION AND CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Corporation spin-offs have become a popular strategy for firms to reorganize their 
operations and structures in the last decade. In the early 1980s, very few companies 
adopted such strategies to divest their assets (See Table 1.1). Such break-up techniques, 
however, have been widely adopted by many leading corporations over the past few years. 
For example, on October, 28,2003, Palm announced that it would spin off its operation 
segment, Palmsource, which develops and licenses software for mobile information 
devices, as an independent publicly traded company. The latest case is the Altria Group 
Inc. In January, 2007, the company announced that it plans to spin off its stake in Kraft 
Food Inc., the national’s largest food marketer, as an independent publicly-held firm.
[Insert Table 1.1 here]
Because of the popularity of spin-offs, many scholars have investigated such 
corporate restructuring phenomena. Kudla and Mclnish (1976) are among the first 
authors to examine the effects on share prices of corporate spin-offs. With only six 
voluntary corporate spin-off samples from 1972-1976, they find that the spin-offs had a 
positive impact on the stock returns of parent companies, thereby increasing 
shareholders’ wealth. Following their findings, several studies have documented that 
corporate spin-offs yield a significant positive return around the time of the 
announcement period. Table 1.2 summarizes the results of studies of returns of corporate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
spin-offs for shareholders in the last three decades. On average, the abnormal return to 
shareholders from spin-offs around the announcement period is approximately 2 to 3%.
[Insert Table 1.2 here]
There is no doubt of the merit of corporate spin-offs, but what contributes to such 
significant gains is ambiguous. In the literature, a number of hypotheses have been 
promoted to interpret such phenomena. Those explanations can be classified into five 
types5: (1) Improving efficiency6 (Schipper and Smith, 1983; Cusatis, Miles, and 
Woolridge, 1993; Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar,1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Burch 
and Nanda, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004; York, 2005; Cloak and Whited, 2006); (2) 
Expropriating wealth from bondholders (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Parrino, 1997;
Maxwell and Rao 2003); (3) Restructuring of managerial incentive contracts (Aron, 1991; 
Pyo, 2006); (4) Reversing previous M&As loss7 (Allen, McConnell, and Reed ,1995; 
Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge, 1993), and (5) Improving information asymmetry (Habib, 
Johnson, and Naik, 1997; Best, Best, and Agapos, 1998; Nanda and Narayanan, 1999; 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).
Despite these explanations about the gains of the spin-offs, it is likely that spin­
offs are driven by the misvaluation of the firms. A spin-off could be beneficial even if the 
efficiency and compensations of divisional managers remain unchanged (Goldman, 2005; 
Chen and Zhang, 2007). The spin-offs that only change the level of misvaluation of 
stocks relative to a firm’s true intrinsic value could still be beneficial to investors. In this
5 Some studies refer to the increasing focus as the diminishing diversification discount (e.g., Burch and 
Nanda, 2003).
6 In this study, I view the focus-increasing motivation as the same as the operating efficiency hypothesis.
7 Notice that these explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, Desai and Jain (1999) 
argued that the focus-increasing spin-offs improve operation efficiency as well as stock market 
performance. Yook (2005) argued that the changes of parent firm performance after spin-offs are positively 
correlated with the changes in informativeness surrounding the spin-off.
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study, I argue that a spin-off can be driven simply by the valuation of the parent firms and 
their spun-off divisions and the gains of spin-offs could be correlated with the degree of 
misvaluation which is induced by different motives.
Based on a 263 spin-offs sample from 1980-2006,1 found that corporate spin-off 
serves as a mechanism to correct the undervaluation problem. The spin-off parent firms 
are severely undervalued, compared to their industry average before the spin-off. As a 
result, managers tend to apply a spin-off strategy to correct the misvaluation problem.
The empirical results show that the undervaluation has been significantly alleviated after 
the spin-offs have been completed, and the level of undervaluation is significantly 
positively correlated with the announcement abnormal returns.
I also investigate the level of misvaluation of spun-off divisions and whether 
those levels are associated with announcement returns. Surprisingly, I find that the spun- 
off divisions are highly overvalued prior to spin-offs. However, the overvaluation soon 
turns into the undervaluation after those divisions becomes independent entities. 
Moreover, I find that giving away a highly undervalued spun-off division can generate 
higher market reactions but the effect is weak.
I further investigate whether both undervaluation of parents and spun-offs 
contribute to the announcement abnormal returns. The empirical results confirm that the 
most undervalued parent firms earn the highest announcement abnormal returns. The 
effects of misvaluation of the spun-offs, however, are not significant. Overall, the 
findings indicate that the gains of a spin-off are primarily attributed to the undervaluation 
correction of parents, rather than the value-enhancement of spun-off divisions.
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Recent studies have documented that misvaluation is a crucial factor that affects 
the corporation investment pattern. Those studies argue that managers rationally respond 
to less-than rational markets. It implies that when the market value of firms diverges from 
the fundamental values of firms, the managers may take advantage of the mispricing (for 
example, Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Baker and Wurgler, 2003). A variety of literature 
has documented how the misvaluation of firms influences corporate decisions. For 
example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that firms issue equity instead of debt when 
they are overvalued, which would explain low post-issue returns. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen (1995) and Dittmar (2000) find that the stock repurchases are associated 
with a low valuation of firms. Graham and Harvey (2001) surveyed 392 CEOs, and their 
report discloses that the recent increase in stock price presents a “window of opportunity” 
for issuing equities. Baker and Wurgler (2002) investigate how marketing timing affects 
capital structure and find low leverage firms are those that raised funds when their market 
valuations were high (high market-to-book ratio), while high leverage firms are those that 
raised funds when their market valuations were low. Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, 
and Teoh (2006) document that the overvaluation of bidders motivates M&As, and 
overpriced equity rather than cash is used as the payment.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related 
literature and predictions based on the misvaluation literature. Section 1.3 details the 
sampling procedure and describes selected characteristics of spin-offs firms. Sectionl.4 
presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 1.5 offers the concluding discussion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous studies have recognized several hypotheses that could contribute to the 
positive abnormal returns during the period of corporate spin-off announcements. The 
efficiency improvement motive has been dominant in corporate spin-off studies. In the 
literature, at least three types of efficiency improvement have been proposed: managerial 
efficiency, operational improvement, and internal asset allocation improvement.
Managerial efficiency suggests that reducing the size and variety of the assets 
under one management may improve either the diseconomies of size which result from 
increasing costs8 (Schipper and Smith, 1983) or the alignment of incentives between 
managers and shareholders (Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997). The operational 
efficiency rationale is the idea that the benefit of spin-offs should be derived from an 
improvement in the operating performance of parent firms’ remaining assets due to the 
“diversification discounts” or “negative excess value” reduction (John and Ofek, 1995; 
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Burch and Nanda, 2003). It implies that the significant value 
creation should be available for focus-increasing spin-offs only; no significant value is 
created for non-focus-increasing spin-offs. Spin-offs can also create value for 
shareholders if  removing unrelated businesses allows managers to focus more on the core 
business. For example, Burch and Nanda (2003) argue that there is a strong relation 
between aggregate value improvements and a reduction in divisional diversity, indicating 
that the diversification discounts can be partially reduced by corporate spin-offs.
The internal asset allocation improvement hypothesis simply suggests that firms 
can reduce their diversification discounts by either eliminating inefficient asset
8 According to Schipper and Smith (1983), the costs include the costs o f decision management and the 
costs of ratification and monitoring o f decisions.
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allocations or changing their investment behavior through spin-offs (Ahn and Denis, 
2004). John (1993) proposes that spin-offs can be value-enhancing by reducing agency 
costs if parent firm debt is optimally allocated between parent and spun-off units. Ahn 
and Denis (2004) find that parent firms before spin-offs are valued at a discount and 
invest less in high Q segments. Such undervaluation is significantly improved after spin­
offs. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) show that the firms increase investment for those 
segments that are underinvested prior to spin-offs events. They argue that the divisional 
investment policy becomes more efficient after the divestiture. Gertner, Powers, and 
Scharfstein (2002) show that spin-offs increase the sensitivity of investment to 
investment opportunities: firms tend to cut investment in low Q industries and increase 
investment in high Q industry, and such improvement of the allocation of capital is the 
reason why investors react favorably to spin-off announcements.
The wealth expropriation hypothesis is promoted by Galai and Masulis (1976). In 
their theoretical model, they argue that debt-holders of parent firms will find their 
position has deteriorated because fewer assets now serve as collateral for the debt. As a 
result, the value of debt-holders is transferred to the limited liability shareholders. 
Therefore, bond holders bear a higher risk after the spin-off due to the loss of collateral 
and liquidation value of the firm.
This hypothesis has gained some support from several empirical studies. Parrino 
(1997) examines the changes in bondholder and shareholder wealth based on Marriott’s 
spin-off event in 1993. He finds a large wealth transfer from senior security bondholders 
to shareholders around the time of the spin-off announcement and a decline in the total 
value of the firm following the event. Maxwell and Rao (2003) find that the bondholders
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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experience on average a significant negative abnormal return of 0.88% in the month of 
the spin-off announcement and the shareholders experience an average 2.9% gain during 
the month of spin-offs announcement. However, Schipper and Smith (1983) and Dittmar 
(2003) dispute those findings. Neither the mean nor the median abnormal bond return in 
their studies is significantly different from zero after spin-offs, indicating that firms are 
less likely to expropriate wealth from the debt holders in spin-offs.
The managerial incentives hypothesis suggests that the spin-off process acts as an 
incentive for divisional managers because an anticipated spin-off gives divisional 
managers the motivation to increase firm value, which will directly affect their 
compensation if the transaction takes place (Aron, 1991). In other words, managers are 
more likely to preserve shareholder interest since the performance of managers is easily 
observed. Pyo (2006) finds that spin-offs are more likely driven by managerial incentives 
rather than by refocusing/operating improvement; managers use spin-offs as a way to 
rewrite management compensation contacts more efficiently and to improve firm 
performance.
Further, the excess stock returns around corporate spin-off announcements could 
be the compensation of wealth losses which are incurred by prior acquisitions. Allen, 
Lummer, McConnell, and Reed (1995) argue that managers who undertake poor 
acquisitions can correct their errors by subsequently divesting the unwise M&As. Sadtler, 
Campbell, and Koch (1997) report that some multi-business companies such as Sears and 
ITT sold their non-core business that they acquired from prior M&As due to years of 
deteriorating performance and increasingly severe market competition.9
9 On February 6th, 2002, the Wall Street Journal also reported that more and more mergers o f the 1990s 
were becoming recent spin-offs. It mentioned that some analysts agreed that many conglomerates try to get
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The information effects of spin-offs have gained attention recently. Such studies 
argue that the information changes through corporate spin-offs are the sources of 
shareholder gain. Habib, Johnson, and Naik (1997) state that spin-offs improve the 
quality of the managers’ investment decisions and reduce uninformed investors’ 
uncertainty about the value of divisions. Both effects lead to an increase in the sum total 
of the market values of a firm from informed investors to managers and to uninformed 
investors. Best, Best, and Agapos (1998), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and 
Nanda and Narayanan (1999) argue that firms that have higher levels of information 
asymmetry are more likely to engage in spin-offs and that the announcement returns are 
positively correlated with the degree of information asymmetry: the spin-off 
announcement period abnormal returns are significantly related to the information 
conveyance. As a result, the information problem decreases significantly after spin-offs.
Numerous studies have questioned the validity of information asymmetry with 
corporations. The main controversy is focused on whether information is more 
transparent after corporate divestitures. Huson and MacKinnon (2003) argue that spin­
offs increase, instead of decrease, the information asymmetry between informed traders 
and uninformed traders since the increased transparent information regarding a firm’s 
value makes traders’ private information more valuable. Goldman (2005) suggests that 
spin-offs can lead either to an increase or to a decrease in aggregate information 
collection and, therefore, does not necessarily increase firm value. Thomas (2002) and 
Hodges and Lin (2004) both examine the relationship between information production 
and diversification and find that information asymmetry is not likely to contribute to the
rid of bad units from prior M&As; others believed that the splits are simply part o f  the “everyday chum of 
business.”
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diversification discount; the greater diversification does not exacerbate information 
problems, which is the opposite of the predictions of information asymmetry hypothesis.
There is another dilemma presented by asymmetric information hypothesis. Based 
on the rationale of information asymmetry, the uncertainty about the intrinsic value will 
be diminished because spin-offs produce more and more transparent information for both 
parents and spun-off units, implying that the gains of spin-offs are attributed to 
“unlocking the hidden value of firms,” which is usually cited by managers when asked 
about the motives behind such transactions.10 If the statement is valid, investors should 
expect that both the divisions and the parents are more likely to be undervalued before 
spin-offs, and therefore, managers tend to adopt a divesting strategy to reform the 
valuation. However, several reports have evidenced that firms and their divisions 
involved in divestitures are not necessarily undervalued. Instead, they could be 
overvalued before spin-offs.11 Sudarsanam and Qian (2006) have quoted a report from 
Financial Times that states that “spin-offs sometimes point to asset categories that are 
overvalued,” since a spate of companies donated overvalued offshoots to their 
shareholders. Such a phenomenon contradicts the predictions of information asymmetry 
hypothesis.
Based on those arguments, it is possible that corporate spin-offs are driven by the 
misvaluation of parents prior to the events, and spin-offs can be viewed as an effective
10 For example, an article o f Returns on Feb, 17, 2000 reported that Dun & Bradstreet Corp. stated that the 
planned spin-off o f its fast-growing Moody’s Investor Service credit rating agency would likely boost the 
business information company’s flagging stock price. Pennzoil Company said on May 7, 1998, that the 
spin-off o f its auto products business would unlock hidden value by creating separate and highly focused 
“pure play” companies.
11 For instance, the Tyco Internationals, which broke the company into three publicly-traded companies, is 
viewed as overvalued by several Wall Street analysts. Alberto-Culver Co., which spun o ff its distribution 
operations, was viewed as overvalued when the spin-off announcement was made.
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mechanism for correcting market inefficiencies. In other words, Managers apply a 
corporate spin-off to signal the market that their shares are undervalued, thereby inducing 
positive price movement during the announcement periods.
Based on the arguments of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Nanda and 
Narayaman (1998), Burch and Nanda (2003), and Chemmanur and Liu (2007), pre-spin- 
off parent firms are more likely to be undervalued, a situation which is caused by 
different reasons.12 When a firm is relatively undervalued, it will jeopardize a firm’s 
capability to obtain external financing and the job security of executives. In addition, 
managers’ compensation packages and options are highly associated with the value of the 
firm. Finally, the undervalued firm could also easily become the target of the M&As. If 
managers believe that the firm is undervalued relative to their superior private 
information, they may attempt to disclose this potentially value-increasing information by 
adopting a spin-off to signal the market. Consequently, this action incurs significantly 
positive announcement abnormal returns which are identified in previous empirical 
studies, and such returns should be highly related with the degree of undervaluation. 
Therefore, I propose the first hypotheses as follows:
HI a: On average, the spin-offs parents are relatively undervalued compared to their 
industry average.
Hlb: The misvaluation (undervaluation) problem will be alleviated after the spin-offs ’ 
completion.
Hlc: The higher degree o f undervaluation ofparent firms is associated with the higher
abnormal return around the time o f the spin-off announcement.
12 Misvaluation could be triggered by information asymmetry, assets misallocated, market sentiment, or the 
overreaction /under-reaction o f investors. I have no intention o f identifying this distinction in this paper.
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The corporate spin-offs could also be driven by the misvaluation of spun-off 
divisions. If managers realize that a subsidiary is highly undervalued, they may approve 
of a spin-off strategy to unlock the hidden value of this segment. Given the future value- 
enhancing of the subsidiary, the market reactions around spin-off announcements should 
be favorable, and the division that is given away is more likely to be an undervalued 
segment rather than an overvalued one.
Conversely, managers may also tend to spin-off an overvalued subsidiary to their 
shareholders. Two possible explanations can be found from literature. Due to the 
asymmetric information between inside managers and outside shareholders, investors 
may observe only the aggregate cash flow and earnings, not those for each division. As a 
result, they could systematically undervalue one division (with good performance) and 
overvalue the other division (with poor performance), while the firm as a whole is being 
undervalued (Nanda, 1991; Nanda and Narayanan, 1999). In this case, managers are 
forced to abandon control over an overvalued division with less information to correct the 
undervaluation problem, but investors may not recognize the fact during the 
announcement periods.
Behavioral perspective provides further evidence why firms are willing to give 
away the overvalued division. Managers may cater to investors demand by giving them 
focused-firms stocks, which are overvalued. In this case, market reactions to spin-off 
announcements that cater to the demand of overvalued stocks should be more positive.
In the study of Sudarsanam and Qian (2006), managers of European companies divested 
overvalued divisions to shareholders, and such decisions maximized the short-run share
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prices and temporarily relieved the pressures to improve the firm performance. Overall, 
both hypotheses suggest that there is a possibility that firms divest an overvalued division.
However, if spun-offs are overvalued, managers should take advantage by either 
issuing equity carve-out (Power, 2003) or initial public offerings (IPOs) (Lucas and 
McDonald, 1990), which will bring cheaper capital into the company. In addition, giving 
a relatively overvalued division to current shareholders will be discovered by the 
investors eventually, thereby causing a return reversal in the future. Several studies, such 
as Allen (2001) and Chemmanur and Liu (2007), find that the insiders and institutional 
shareholders are substantial purchasers of stock in the public subsidiaries subsequent to 
spin-offs, implying that the spun-off divisions are more likely to be undervalued rather 
than overvalued.
Based on those arguments, I propose the second set of hypotheses about the 
valuation of the spun-off divisions as follows:
H2a: On average, the spun-offs divisions are relatively undervalued than their industry 
average.
H2b: The misevaluation (undervaluation) problem will be alleviated after spin-offs
completion.
H2c: The degree o f  undervalued spun-off divisions is positively associated with the
abnormal announcement return ofparents: The higher level o f an undervalued 
spun-off division, the higher announcement abnormal returns ofparents.
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1.3 DATA
1.3.1 Data Sources and Requirements
Using the Thomas ONE Banker database (the former Deals Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database), I identify a sample of U.S. firms that undertook spin-offs 
during the 1980-2006 period. The Thomas ONE Banker data include the announcement 
dates and effective dates, the CUSIP identifiers and the tickers for parent and spun-off 
firms, transaction data, and a brief description of the spin-off deals. To be included in our 
sample, those spin-offs must meet following criteria:
1. Deals must be voluntary tax-free spin-offs.13 Any non-voluntary spin-offs such as 
those forced through anti-trust regulation and taxable distribution deals are 
excluded from the sample.
2. The spin-off is not part of liquidity, bankruptcy, or merger processing.
3. Financial firms’ spin-offs (parent firms with SIC code 6000-6999) are dropped 
from the sample.
13 Section 355 o f the Internal Revenue Code allows a corporation to make a tax-free distribution to its 
shareholders o f stock and securities in one or more controlled subsidiaries.To be qualified for the tax-free 
treatment, firms must satisfy the following requirements: (a) The distributing corporation must distribute 
the stock o f a controlled corporation (defined as owning at least 80% of the voting power and at least 80% 
of the shares o f  each class o f non-voting stock), preexisting or newly created, to its shareholders, (b) The 
distributing corporation generally must distribute all its controlled corporation stock and securities 
immediately before the transaction, (c) Following the distribution, both the controlled and distributing 
corporations must be actively engaged in a trade or business with a five-year history, (d) Neither the 
distributing nor the controlled corporation can use the spin-off as a device for distributing earnings and 
profits, (e) A spin-off is to be motivated, in whole or substantial part, by one or more corporate business 
purposes. The purpose(s) must be real and substantial and germane to the distributing or controlled 
corporations business or to the affiliated group o f which the distributing corporation is a member, (f) 
Following the distribution o f the controlled corporations stock, the distributing corporation shareholders 
must maintain continuity o f  interest in both companies. Revenue procedure 96-30 further states this 
requirement generally is met if  one or more persons who directly or indirectly own the distributing 
corporation before the distribution also own 50% or more o f the stock in each o f the modified companies 
after the separation.
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4. The announcement and effective day of spin-offs must be identifiable through 
articles from Factiva.
5. Spin-off parent firms’ data must be available on the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), COMPUSTAT, and Compact Disclosure databases.
I use Factiva to identify detailed information about each spin-off deal and the 
Cleaning House’s Capital Changes Reporter fCCR) to determine each deal’s tax status. I 
collect price and return data from CRSP and accounting data from COMPUSTAT and 
Compact Disclosure. The financial analysts’ data is from Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S). Initially, I obtained 765 spin-offs from Thomson ONE Banker. I 
excluded 127 records with unverified announcement dates through Wall Street Journal 
articles, 66 records with carve-out, 39 records with taxable spin-offs, 11 records with 
non-voluntary spin-offs, 42 records combined with other corporate events (such as 
M&As and dividend announcements), 55 non-spin-off records14, 98 records with parent 
firms operating in the financial industry, 21 non-voluntary (regulation) records, 8 
duplicate records, and 5 foreign spin-offs records. I also deleted 30 firms for which either 
market value data or book value data is not available (Tablel .3). The final sample 
consists of 263 spin-offs divested by 254 companies from 1980-2006.
[Insert Table 1.3 here]
Table 1.4 shows the distribution of spin-offs by year. Around 45% of the spin-offs 
occurred during 1995-2000, with the highest 23 spin-offs in 1995, followed by 21 deals 
in 1998, and 20 deals in both 1996 and 1999. More than 85% of the parent firms (221 of 
254) have multiple segments; only 33 firms operate on a single business. There are 169
14 Those deals include split-up, tracking stock, leverage buyout, and sell-offs.
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spin-offs where the operations of the parent firm and the spun-off subsidiaries differ at 
the first two-digit SIC code level, and 94 occur where the parent and spun-off 
subsidiaries have the same first two-digit SIC codes. In addition, 181 out of 254 parent 
firms are traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 65 are traded on the 
NASDAQ and 17 are listed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX).
[Insert Table 1.4 here]
1.3.2 Matching Industry
For comparison purposes, I first find a matching industry which has similar 
characteristics with the parents and spun-off subsidiaries before and after the spin-off 
announcements. In this study, two types of matching industries are identified: a peer 
industry and a peer-specified firm industry. A peer industry is defined as the industry of 
firms having similar businesses with parent/spun-off subsidiaries. The peer-specified 
industry is the industry of one-segment firms having similar businesses with parent/spun- 
off subsidiaries. I start the matching process with the peer industry firms that have the 
same four-digit SIC codes as the parents/spun-off subsidiaries at the end of the fiscal year 
(t-1) prior to the announcement year (t), and at the end of the fiscal year one year (e+1) 
after the effective year (e). If no such industry is found or the number of firms within this 
industry is less than five, then the three-digit SIC codes are used followed by two-digit 
SIC codes and one-digit SIC codes. I repeat the same processes to form a peer-specified 
industry. All firms’ segment data is from the COMPUSTAT Industry Segment database.
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1.3.3 Measure of Misvaluation
I assume that the level of misvaluation of firms is correlated with the spin-offs 
announcement returns. Following Baker and Wugler (2002) and others, I apply the 
market-to-book (M/B) ratio as the proxy of misvaluation.
I calculate the M/B ratio of the industry average based on the matched peer 
industry of the parents and spun-off subsidiaries. The M/B ratio of the peer industry 
average (the peer specified-firm industry average) for pre-spin-offs is the value-asset- 
weight mean and median of the ratio of the market equity at the end of December of the 
fiscal year t-1, divided by the book common equity for the fiscal year ending t-1, in each 
matched peer industry (matched peer specified-firm industry). The M/B ratio of the peer 
industry average (the peer specified-firm industry average) for post-spin-offs is the value- 
asset-weight mean and median of ratio of market equity at the end of December of the 
fiscal year e+1, divided by the book common equity for the fiscal year e+1, in each 
matched peer industry (peer specified-firm industry).
The M/B ratio for both the parent firms and the spun-off subsidiaries are also 
calculated. The pre-spin-off M/B ratio of parent firms is the ratio of market equity at the 
end of December of the year t - 1  divided by the book common equity for the fiscal year 
ending in the year t - 1 ,  and the post-spin-off M/B ratio of the parent firms (spun-off 
subsidiaries) is the ratio of market equity at the end of December of the year e + 1, 
divided by the book common equity for the fiscal year ending in year e + 1. The pre-spin­
off M/B ratio of the spun-off subsidiaries is the ratio of estimated market equity in the 
year t - 1 ,  divided by book common equity for the fiscal year ending in the year t-1 .  To
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estimate the market equity of spun-off subsidiaries prior to the announcement, I apply the 
following multiplier estimation method inspired by Berger and Ofek (1995)15:
(  V \
E(MV) = AI, * (Ind ) -  BD, (1)
'  m fAI
Where
E (MV) = the estimated market value of a spun-off segment as a stand-alone firm
AI/ = spun-off division j’s value of the accounting item (sales or assets) used in
the valuation multiple
( V \
Ind\ —  = multiplier of total capital to an accounting item (sales or assets) for the
\ A I , m f
median single-segment firm in segment V s industry
V = a single-segment firm’s total capital (market value of common equity plus
book value of debt)
BD = the book value of the debt of a spun-off segment
All the variables used in equation (1) are the numbers at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the announcement year.
1.3.4 Measure of Announcement Return
Abnormal returns around the spin-off announcement of parent firms are 
calculated by using the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) with the CRSP value- 
weighted index as the benchmark of the market portfolio. The estimated period is over a
15 In Berger and Ofek (1995), three accounting multipliers (sales, asset and EBIT) are applied to estimate 
the excess value o f  the firms. Due to the bias of EBIT, I apply only the sales and assets (not reported) 
multiplier. Using the assets multiplier basically generates a similar result as applying the sales multiplier.
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255 trading-day period, ending 5 trading days prior to the announcement day. Abnormal 
returns with several time intervals around the announcement day for parent firms are 
examined. The average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the median cumulative 
abnormal returns are reported.
1.3.5 Parent Firms Characteristics
Table 1.5 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample parent firms, peer 
industries, and spin-off transactions. The reported financial data is based on the end-of- 
fiscal-year information prior to the spin-off announcement. The average sales of sample 
firms are $5.35 billion, and the average book value of total assets of the sample parent 
firms is $7 billion, both of which are significantly less than their industry average. The 
mean and median market value of parent firms prior to the announcement year is $23 
billion and $3.3 billion, respectively. In addition, the sample firms apply almost two 
times more debt than equity to structure their assets, which is significantly lower than 
their industry average. Moreover, the leverage data show that sample firms, on average, 
do not suffer from financial distress. In terms of profitability, the return on assets (ROA) 
and the return on equity (ROE) are 2% and 5.8%, respectively, which are lower than the 
industry average but not significantly different. Compared to their peer industry, parent 
firms own fewer segments but the degree of the diversification is much higher than their 
industry average before spin-offs which is measured by the Herfindahl index. Panel B 
discloses selected information about spin-offs transactions. The transaction value is based 
on the market value of spin-off subsidiaries at the end of the first trading day, and the 
spin-off size is the ratio of the spin-off transaction value to the market value of the parent
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firm one day prior to the ex-day. The transaction value of spin-offs is around $8.7 billion, 
and the spun-off subsidiary represents 28.64 % of the market value of a parent firm’s 
capitalization. In general, parent firms take an average 209 days to complete the 
transaction.
[Insert Table 1.5 here]
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1.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
1.4.1 Abnormal Returns
The mean and median abnormal returns around the announcements of spin-offs 
are reported in Table 1.6. Similar to earlier studies, I confirm those positive returns 
around spin-offs. A three-day window (-1,1) has a significant mean cumulative abnormal 
return of 3.52%. Significant positive abnormal returns of 2.05% and 2.61% are also 
found on the announcement day and in the window (-1, 0), respectively. Consistent with 
previous studies, I do not find significant drift after spin-off announcements.
[Insert Table 1.6 here]
1.4.2 Misvaluation Estimation
If spin-offs are driven by the undervaluation, significantly undervaluation of 
parent firms as well as of their divisions should be observed. In this section, I investigate 
the level of misvaluation of parent firms and spun-off subsidiaries before and after spin­
offs by comparing the M/B ratios of parent firms/spun-off divisions with those of their 
peer industry. Panel A of Table 1.7 presents the level of misvaluation between sample 
parents and their matched industry. On average, parent firms are more highly 
undervalued than their pure-play industry and peer industry before spin-offs. The 
undervaluation has been alleviated subsequent to spin-offs. The data show that even 
though the parents are still more undervalued than their pure-play peers, their M/B ratio 
has increased around 18% one year after the spin-offs are completed, and this result is not 
significant in comparison to their peer industry. The findings confirm the belief that a
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spin-off could serve as a mechanism to correct the undervaluation problem of parents, 
which is consistent with HI a and H lb hypothesis.16
[Insert Table 1.7 here]
Panel B of Table 1.7 reports the level of misvaluation for sample spun-off 
subsidiaries and their peer industry. Surprisingly, sample spun-off divisions are highly 
overvalued before the spin-off, compared to their peer industry and pure-play peers. 
However, such overvaluation ultimately turns into undervaluation. After one year as an 
independent entity, the M/B ratio of spun-off subsidiaries has declined significantly, and 
the after-spin-off M/B ratio is considerably lower than that of their peer industry as well 
as that of their pure-play industry peers. The findings are opposite to the hypothesis H2a 
and H2b, which predicate that an undervalued spun-off division is more likely to be 
divested and such misvaluation of divisions should be corrected soon after spin-offs are 
completed.
The overvaluation of a spun-off division could be attributed to managerial 
incentive or information asymmetry. Berger and Ofek (1995) have argued that managers 
do have some ability to allocate sales/assets and greater discretion to allocate expenses or 
overstate earnings to both providers of capital and product market competitors. This 
proposal implies that managers have motives to overstate the value-relevant accounting 
numbers of the spun-off divisions before the spin-offs in order to attract investors’ 
attention. Information asymmetry hypothesis suggests that investors have difficulties to 
observing each division’s cash flow and earnings directly, so the valuation of a firm will 
be decided by the average performance of all divisions. In other words, investors could
161 also checked the M/B two and three years after spin-offs completion. The results (which are not 
reported) are the same as these findings.
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potentially overvalue one poor-performance division and undervalue another better- 
performance division. Since managers tend to maintain the profitability of a firm, they 
are more willing to give up the control of the poor-performance division that is 
overvalued. Since more transparent information about the spun-off divisions becomes 
available soon after the announcements, the overvaluation will be caught by investors 
eventually, thereby, driving the value reversal. Such after-spin-off undervaluation may 
also explain why many spun-off subsidiaries become future targets of M&As.
Since undervalued firms are more likely to adopt spin-offs to solve the valuation 
problem, the relatively undervalued firms should earn higher returns at the time of 
announcements. To examine this rationale, I sort the sample parent firms into quartiles 
(lowest to highest based on their industry-adjusted misvaluation) and examine the 
quartiles to see whether the abnormal returns are significantly different between the top 
quartile relative to the bottom quartile. As showed in Table 1.8, the average abnormal 
returns are significantly higher for the bottom quartile (highly undervalued parents) than 
the top quartile (highly overvalued parents). For example, the bottom quartile earns 
average two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 4.54% (median 4.08%), 
while they are 2.04% (median 1.33%) in the top quartile. The difference of 2.5% (median 
2.75%) is significant at the 10% level (median at 5% level). The findings strongly support 
Hlc; the highly undervalued parent firms that adopt a spin-off should earn the highest 
abnormal announcement returns.
[Insert Table 1.8 here]
It is also possible that a spin-off is driven by the undervaluation of the spun-off 
division when the profitability of the division is “buried” under the parent firm. In this
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case, divisional managers may request the combined firm to spin off their division in 
order to unlock the hidden value. Based on the motives of undervaluation hypothesis, 
firms that spin-off highly undervalued divisions should earn higher returns at the time of 
announcements. I investigate this logic by sorting the announcement returns of parent 
samples by the industry-adjusted misvaluation of spun-off units. The results in Panel B of 
Table 1.9 show that the abnormal announcement returns of parents decrease from the 
bottom quartile that divests the highest level of undervalued divisions to the top quartile 
that divests the highest level of overvalued ones. For example, the bottom quartile (with 
the highest undervalued spun-off divisions) earn average two-day CARs of 4.06% 
(median 2.92%), while they are 2.31% (median 1.69%) in the top quartile (with the 
highest overvalued spun-off divisions). The mean difference 1.75% (median 1.23%), 
however, is not statistically significant. The findings in Table 1.9 partly support 
hypothesis H2c, which predicates a significant positive relation between the level of 
undervaluation of spun-off divisions and the announcement abnormal returns.
[Insert Table 1.9 here]
1.4.3 Cross-Sectional Regressions
The undervaluation explanation predicates a positive association between the 
degree of the undervaluation and the market reaction to the corporate spin-offs. In this 
section, I conduct multiple regression methods to investigate this statement. The three- 
day window (-1,1) announcement returns are regressed on the misvaluation proxy 
(market-to-book ratio of a parent (M/B) and that of a spun-off division (TM/B)) and a set 
of control variables for other known potential predictions in the regression model. Based
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on the undervaluation hypothesis, both M/B and TM/B should be negatively correlated 
with the announcement returns.
However, the relation between the valuation of spun-off divisions and the returns 
could be positive. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) have argued that parent firms have 
incentives to spin-off overvalued divisions, which are less informative and perform 
poorly, because the action causes undervaluation of the combined firm. This 
interpretation implies that the higher gains of a spin-off could be attributed to giving 
away a highly overvalued division, if the gains of the holding stocks of parent firms can 
compensate the loss of holding the overvalued stocks of divisions. Market sentiment 
hypothesis also provides another example to forecast a positive relation. Sudarsanam and 
Qian (2006) have argued that catering plays a role in corporate spin-off decisions. 
Managers tend to give overvalued divisions to shareholders if investors demand glamour 
stocks, thereby maximizing the short-run share prices and temporarily relieving the 
pressures to improve the firm. In this case, giving away a highly overvalued spun-off 
division will be more welcome by the market than giving away a relatively undervalued 
one. Both explanations suggest a potential positive relation between the announcement 
returns and the degree of overvaluation of a divested division.
The control variables considered in our regression models include debt/equity 
ratio (D/E), sales-based Herfindahl index (HERFINDAHL), focus dummy (FOCUS), 
profitability proxy (ROA), information asymmetry proxy (SD), and the hot/cold market 
dummy (N IPOs). D/E ratio is applied to control the bondholders’ wealthy expropriation 
effect, which is advocated by Galai and Masulis (1976), Parrino (1997), and Maxwell and 
Rao (2003). If a firm has too much debt, it will face the capital constraint. Spin-offs
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provide a firm an opportunity to transfer debt to spun-off divisions thereby increasing its 
borrowing capacity.
HERFINDAHL serves as a proxy of level of diversification. It is calculated across 
n business segments as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales as a proportion of 
total sales of parent firms in the fiscal year prior to announcement year. Previous studies 
such as Berger and Ofek (1995), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), and Lamont and 
Polk (2002) have documented that the diversified firms suffer from diversification 
discount. Since the level of diversification will diminish after the divestiture, the market 
should approve of a spin-off decision. Focus dummy (FOCUS) is applied to control 
whether gains of spin-offs are derived from focusing increasing transactions. The FOCUS 
is defined as 1 when the parent and the spun-off division have different first 2-digit SIC 
codes and 0 otherwise. Several studies have stated that a focus-increasing spin-off can 
improve a firm’s operating performance (Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997; Desai 
and Jain, 1999) or diversification discount (Burch and Nanda, 2003), while non-focus- 
increases deals do not. Therefore, I expect focus-increasing spin-offs earn higher 
announcement abnormal returns.
ROA is included to control the level of profitability. It is calculated as the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to the book value of assets in the year prior to the 
spin-off announcement year. Chemmanur and Liu (2007) have argued that firms that 
choose a spin-off strategy should be the ones with better profitability and high cash flow 
realization in the future. Therefore, I expect that higher profitable firms should earn 
higher announcement returns.
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SD represents the level of information asymmetry. It is measured as the standard 
deviation of the market model residual over the period from 255 to 5 days before the 
spin-offs announcement day. Nanda and Narayanan (1999), Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999), and Chemmanur and Liu (2007) have documented that gains of 
spin-offs could be attributed to the improvement of asymmetric information suggesting 
that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry should earn higher announcement 
returns because such a problem is alleviated subsequently.
Finally, the number of IPOs in the industries of spun-off divisions is applied to 
identify whether a spin-off is influenced by the market condition. When market is 
optimistic about the industries of the spun-off divisions, managers tend to issue equity of 
the spun-off division (carve-out) rather than a spin-off. Therefore, a negative relation 
between the hot-market condition and the announcement abnormal returns is expected.
The results of cross-sectional regressions and their statistics are reported in Table 
1.10. The univariate test in regression 1 demonstrates that there is a significant negative 
relation between the level of overvaluation and the announcement returns. The coefficient 
of M/B is -0.004 and is statistically significant at the 1% level (/-statistics=-2.713). The 
multivariate regressions also return similar results. A significant negative correlation 
between the level of overvaluation and the announcement abnormal is found in 
regressions 2 to 4. The influence of M/B is significant at the 1% to 5% level, which 
strongly supports the undervaluation prediction.
[Insert Table 1.10 here]
In terms of the effects of the valuation of the spun-off divisions, regressions 5 and 
6 show that there is a negative relation between the levels of overvaluation of the spun-
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off subsidiaries and the announcement returns, which indicates that giving away the 
relatively overvalued divisions to shareholders will be discounted by the market.
However, the effect is weak and insignificant. Such phenomenon might be caused by the 
nature of parents firms before spin-offs: Given the high level of information asymmetry 
before a corporate spin-off, investors may not be able to observe each division’s 
performance directly. Consequently, they should rely primarily on the overall 
performance of the combined firm to decide the valuation of each division. In other 
words, a division’s value is determined by the combined firm’s information. It may 
explain why the effects of the valuation of the divisions are not substantial. Furthermore, 
since the spun-offs only account for a small portion of the value of the combined firm, 
investors may focus mainly on the change of the value of parent firms rather than the 
spun-off division. The findings of multiple regressions are in opposition to the catering 
hypothesis, which asserts that investors will favor glamour divisions (stocks), thereby 
contributing to significantly higher announcement abnormal returns.
The results in Table 1.10 also indicate that the gains of a spin-off could be 
triggered by other motives. Regression 4 and regression 5 indicate that a higher level of 
information asymmetry before the spin-off contributes to a higher market reaction, a 
finding which is consistent with those of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999). 
Moreover, it supports the bondholders’ wealth extrapolation explanation, which indicates 
that a spin-off could potentially improve a firm’s debt capability by transferring debts to 
its spun-off divisions.
Overall, the regression models demonstrate that the gains of a spin-off are 
strongly contributed by the undervaluation correction of parents, and information
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hypothesis and bondholders wealth extrapolation also play a role in contributing to the 
gains at the time of announcements.
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS
Despite an increase in recent years in misvaluation arguments about corporate and 
investment decisions, there has been relatively little analysis of the degree to which 
misvaluation of a firm influences gains of corporate spin-offs. The undervaluation 
hypothesis implies that the gains of spin-offs are attributed to the correction of 
undervaluation problems. Therefore, both parent firms and spun-off divisions are more 
likely to be undervalued rather than overvalued before spin-offs.
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relation between gains of 
corporate spin-offs and misvaluation. I argued that spin-offs could be beneficial even 
though the efficiency and compensations of divisional managers remains unchanged. The 
corporate spin-offs could be driven simply by misvaluation of a parent firm as well as its 
spun-off division, and the gains around announcements should be associated with their 
degree of misvaluation.
Based on a sample of 263 spin-offs from 1980 to 2006,1 found that corporate 
spin-off serves as a mechanism to adjust an undervaluation problem. Parent firms are 
more severely undervalued than their peer industry before spin-offs. It is likely that 
managers tend to apply a spin-off strategy to boost the valuation of firms. The empirical 
results indicate that the undervaluation problem has been partially alleviated after a spin­
off is completed and the level of undervaluation of a parent firm is significantly 
positively correlated with the announcements abnormal returns.
I also investigated whether the level of valuation of spun-off divisions are 
associated with announcement returns. Surprisingly, the spun-off divisions are highly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
overvalued prior to spin-offs. However, the overvaluation soon turns into undervaluation 
after a division becomes an independent entity.
Further I investigated whether the undervaluation of parents and spun-offs 
contribute to the announcement abnormal returns. My empirical results confirm that the 
most undervalued parent firms earn the highest announcement abnormal returns. I also 
find that giving away a highly undervalued spun-off division can generate higher market 
reactions. However, the effect is insignificant, thus only partially supporting the 
undervaluation hypothesis. Overall, the findings indicate that the gains of spin-offs are 
primarily attributed to the undervaluation correction of parent firms, rather than the value 
created by spun-off divisions.
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ESSAY 2 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this study, I investigate whether managers “manage” their earnings before 
corporate spin-offs. Corporate spin-offs have been recognized as favorable corporate 
events since significant positive abnormal returns around spin-off announcements have 
been documented by extant literature (Hite and Owers, 1983; Daley, Mehrotra, and 
Sivakumar, 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; and 
others.). Several authors have argued that the sources of the gains can be explained by (1) 
Improving efficiency (Schipper and Smith, 1983; Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge, 1993; 
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Burch and Nanda, 2003; 
Ahn and Denis, 2004; York, 2005; Cloak and Whited, 2006); (2) Expropriating wealth 
from bondholders (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Parrino, 1997; Maxwell and Rao, 2003); (3) 
Restructuring of managerial incentive contracts (Aron, 1991; Pyo, 2006); (4) Reversing 
previous M&As loss (Allen, McConnell, and Reed ,1995; Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge, 
1993).
Recently, several studies have recognized that the value increase of spin-offs is a 
result of information asymmetry.17 Nanda and Narayanan (1999) suggest that the positive 
gains of shareholders are attributed to the change in the level of information of the stock
17 Two types o f information asymmetry have been advocated in literature. The first is the asymmetric 
information between insiders (managers) and investors (Habib, Johnson, and Naik, 1997; Nanda and 
Narayanan, 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Allen, 2001). The second one is the asymmetric 
information between investors (Huson and MacKinnon; 2003). In this study, information asymmetry refers 
to the former definition.
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price relative to the firm’s true economic value. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 
indicate that firms that have a higher level of information asymmetry are more likely to 
engage in spin-offs. This information asymmetry problem is mitigated significantly after 
the spin-off, thereby enhancing the value of the firms.
Given the high level of information asymmetry of the firm before spin-offs, it is 
reasonable to assume that managers should possess private information about the firm 
and its current and prospective earnings that shareholders do not have. Such a 
discrepancy in information gives managers incentives to manipulate earnings reports, 
thus influencing investors’ perceptions about the firm’s value because a firm’s value is 
based on the present value of expected future earnings. Additionally, managers’ 
compensation packages, as well as options, are based upon the valuation of the firm. In 
this study, I refer to such motivation of earnings management as the opportunistic 
hypothesis. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999, p.79) have argued that an ordinary 
disclosure of the information by a combined firm may not be reliable because a firm can 
manipulate shared costs across divisions to maximize proceeds from new security issues. 
The financial executives survey of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2006) shows that 
more than 80% of senior managers agree that maintaining or increasing their firms’ stock 
price is their priority. In addition, most of the chief financial officers have strong 
intentions to “sacrifice economic value of values” in order to smooth earnings. Trueman 
and Titman (1988), Dye (1988), and Richardson (2000) have argued that information 
asymmetry is a necessary condition for earnings management and the level of 
information asymmetry should be positively correlated with the level of earnings 
manipulation.
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Nevertheless, managers who engage in earnings management activities may not 
intend to mislead investors. When managers have favorable private information that 
investors do not have, they can use earnings management in conjunction with a corporate 
event to signal the market about the value of the firm. Consequently, mangers of a spin­
off firm may tend to correct the undervaluation problem by inflating earnings to reflect 
the true economic value of the firm. I refer to this motivation as the private signaling 
hypothesis. Subramanyam (1996) suggests that managers can use discretionary accruals 
to increase the ability of earnings, thereby conveying the information of firm value. Louis 
and Robinson (2005) have found that managers use accruals to express their optimism 
about their firms’ future, and investors perceive the signal and price the accruals 
efficiently.
By using a 240 spin-off sample from 1980-2006,1 discover that firms 
aggressively manage earnings prior to the announcements. The results show that the level 
of abnormal accruals of spin-off parents increases significantly prior to the spin-off 
announcements and becomes insignificant after spin-offs are completed. I also identify 
that pre-spin-off abnormal accruals have predictive power for the spin-off announcement 
returns. The findings indicate that significant, positive spin-off announcement returns are 
partly attributed to the pre-spin-off earnings management. Additionally, I find a positive 
relation between the levels of earnings management and the long-term returns after the 
spin-offs, a finding which is consistent with the signaling hypothesis prediction. However, 
the predictive effect is not statistically significant on the one-year return after the 
announcements. A number of explanations regarding the findings are discussed.
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The reminder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the estimation of 
the abnormal accruals and returns measurement .Section 2.4 describes the sample 
selection, the sample characteristics and the abnormal returns findings. Section 2.5 
reports the relation between abnormal accruals and abnormal returns. Section 2.6 
describes the results of the regression model regarding the predictability of abnormal 
accruals. The conclusions are presented in Section 2.7.
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Earnings management could occur when managers manage financial reporting 
either to mislead outside investors about the underlying economic performance of the 
firm or to influence valuations depending on reported accounting numbers. The 
importance of earnings creates a strong incentive for managers to control accounting 
earnings number to serve their own interests before or during corporate events. Numerous 
studies have documented that corporate managers have objectives for manipulating 
earnings during corporate events, such as initial public offers (IPOs) (Teoh, Wong, and 
Rao, 1998a; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998b; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004; 
Zheng and Stangeland, 2007), reverse leveraged buyouts Chou, Gombola, and Liu,
2006), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998c; Rangan, 1998; 
Shivakumar, 2000; Lim, Thong, and Ding, 2007), stock splits (Louis and Robinson,
2005), mergers and acquisitions (M&As) ( Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004), 
cross-listing (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006), and management buyouts (DeAngelo, 
1988; Perry and Williams, 1994).
Even though it is a well known fact that managers attempt to influence stock 
prices, their motives for earnings management are still in debate. The prevailing 
assumption to explain earnings management is managerial opportunism. This hypothesis 
assumes that managers tend to manipulate earnings when there are gaps between firm 
performance and investors’ expectations. For example, firms are more likely to report a
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high level of accruals (income-increasing) prior to IPOs and SEOs18 (Teoh, Wong, and 
Rao, 1998a; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998b; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004; 
Zheng and Stangeland, 2007; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998c; Rangan, 1998;
Shivakumar, 2000; Lim, Thong, and Ding, 2007). There is also evidence that acquiring 
firms inflate with earnings of prior to stock mergers (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 
2004) in order to reduce buying costs.
Based on these findings, there are several possibilities that managers may have 
incentives to manage earnings before corporate spin-offs. First, those parent firms are 
decreasing profitbefore spin-offs19 (Desai and Jain, 1999). Given that managers are 
expected to report/maintain positive earnings and meet analysts’ expectations (DeGeorge, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999), they have a motive to boost the market value by 
overstating earnings. Second, the spin-off firms are more likely to be undervalued 
compared to industry peers due to the disadvantages of the combined firms. Since 
managers’ compensation packages and options are highly correlated with the value of the 
stocks, managers are willing to change the earnings to correct the undervalue problem. 
Third, parent firms may have information asymmetry dilemmas before spin-offs. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that firms that engage in spin-offs have a 
high level of information asymmetry before the announcements. If uninformed investors
18 Shivakumar (2000), however, argues that earnings management o f  SEOs may not necessarily be 
designed to mislead investors. It may only reflect the issuers’ rational response to anticipated market 
behavior at offering announcements.
19 For example, on August 27,2002, HealthSouth announced that it was considering spinning off its 
surgery-center division and focusing on its more profitable inpatient rehab hospitals after the earnings 
dropped.
20 Such disadvantages can be driven by either the poor performance o f  spun-off divisions (Woo, Willard, 
and Daellenbach, 1992; Desai and Jain, 1999), the inappropriate asset allocations/inefficient investment 
(Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein, 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000), 
information asymmetry (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999), or diversification discount (Berger and 
Ofek, 1995, 1999).
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cannot observe each division’s cash flow and earnings directly, managers may take 
advantage of transferring shared costs in order to increase earnings number. Several 
articles also indicate that information asymmetry and earnings management are highly 
correlated (Chaney and Lewis, 1995; Richardson, 2000; Lim, Thong, and Ding, 2007). 
Therefore, it is logical to assume that managers tend to manage their earnings before 
corporate spin-offs.
Nonetheless, the information asymmetry may not necessarily indicate the 
opportunistic behaviors of managers. Since the information problem interferes with the 
communication between managers and outside investors, the market is more likely to 
discount a firm’s value due to uncertainty. When the undervaluation creates capital 
constraints for the firms as well as crisis for the job security of executives, those 
managers may apply accruals to signal favorable information to the market, thereby 
correcting the stock value. Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson (1989) and Beaver and 
Engel (1996) find that managers use loan loss provisions to signal firms’ future operation 
performance. Louis and Robinson (2005) also state that the managers combine the 
earnings management and the stock split to communicate private information to 
shareholders.
Considering those arguments, I assume that managers have strong incentives to 
manage earnings before corporate spin-offs. Therefore,
H I: Firms that adopt spin-offs report significant abnormal accruals prior to the spin-off 
announcements
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Although managers could use discretionary accruals as an attempt to improve the 
valuation of the firm, investors may not be able to fully price such earnings increases 
because the uncertainty of parent firms or divisions’ cash flow and earnings are affected 
by the high level of information asymmetry. According to the opportunistic hypothesis, 
managers may use corporate events with an intention to hide an earnings maneuver so 
they can mislead investors’ beliefs about their firms’ future. Due to the complex 
restructuring of firms before the break up, it is likely that investors may not be able to 
identify managers’ motives.21 Sloan (1996) states that investors fail to price correctly the 
accruals component of earnings instantaneously. Defond and Park (2001) and Xie (2001) 
both argue that the market usually fails to price abnormal accruals accurately because 
investors are either unable to anticipate the future reversal of those abnormal accruals or 
overestimate the persistence of those accruals. This situation will become more severe 
once managers apply favorable corporate events to magnify the mispricing. Allen (2001) 
argues that the reason that managers would like to give up control over assets is 
managerial opportunism. For example, if insiders hold favorable information regarding 
the parent firm or division that is not fully observed by outside investors, they may 
change their portfolios by exaggerating the firm’s or division’s prospect. Based on the 
evidence, it is rational to assume that investors will value abnormal (unexpected) accruals 
before spin-off announcements and the announcement returns should be positively 
correlated with the level of abnormal accruals.
Signaling motive rationalization about earnings management provides more 
evidence for evaluating the relationship between the announcement returns and the
21 Based on my review o f  all spin-offs news from FACTICA, the most cited reason by firms’ managers 
who adopt spin-offs is “value creation.” Only a few firms claim that the purpose o f the spin-offs is to 
reduce “the losses o f  current operations.”
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abnormal accruals. Managers can use corporate spin-offs to alleviate information 
problems22, thereby verifying their earnings reports. In other words, managers could use 
spin-off announcements to increase the validity of the accruals before the announcements, 
whereas accruals could strengthen their spin-off decision. Chemmanur and Liu (2007) 
state that, when insiders of parents have favorable private information, they are more 
likely to adopt the spin-off strategy in order to convey this information to outsider 
shareholders in order to stimulate a positive price movement. Louis and Robinson (2005) 
find that pre-split abnormal accrual is associated with stock split announcement returns, 
while the pre-split abnormal accruals are viewed as a signal of managerial optimism 
rather than managerial opportunism.
Based on the above discussion, I formulate the second hypothesis as follows:
H2: The spin-offs announcement returns are positively correlated with the pre-spin-offs 
abnormal accruals.
However, Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) have 
showed that a positive relation between returns and discretionary accruals could be both 
the opportunistic behavior and the signaling effect. One way to distinguish these two 
motives is to evaluate the relation between the long-term returns of parent firms and the 
level of pre-event abnormal accruals.
Even though managers can maneuver accruals to boost stock price in the short run,
they cannot manage the earnings frequently because it is costly. In general, earnings
management can incur both direct and indirect costs ( Xue, 2004). When a firm manages
22 For example, on April, 27,2007, Layne and Alexis from Bloomberg reported that Wall Street analysts 
urged GE to separate its NBC Universal, GE Money, and real-estate division due to the difficulties of 
understanding the true value o f  the firm.
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earnings by manipulating operating cash flows, the lower future profitability imposes a 
direct cost on the firm. It also could increase indirect costs such as reduced reliability of 
earnings, loss of reputation, and higher tax payment in the future. If the abnormal 
accruals of spin-off firms are driven by opportunism, these abnormal accruals could not 
persist for a long time. In other words, firms that manipulate accruals by attempting to 
borrow earnings from the future will not be able to maintain the same level of accruals in 
the future. The high level of abnormal accruals is expected to disappear when information 
about the firms’ condition is revealed. Once the firms’ cash flow and earnings are more 
easily observed, managers’ attempts to control the accruals will be recognized by 
investors. Consequently, a return reversal is expected in the subsequent periods. Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998c) have argued that the long term underperformance of IPOs can 
be attributed to “aggregative” earnings management. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998c) 
also find that the investors naively extrapolate pre-issue earnings without adjusting for 
the manipulation of reported earnings, thereby causing long-term underperformance of 
SEOs. Louis (2004) finds a post-merger price reversal is partly caused by pre-merger 
earnings management for stock swap acquisitions.
On the other hand, managers may use earnings management to signal their future 
prospects. The purpose of reporting high earnings is based on the rationale that managers 
are optimistic about their firms’ future. Consequently, when a firm reports superior 
earnings, investors will place a higher value on that firm because they expect the firm can 
main the same level of earnings in the future. Since managing accruals is costly, only 
firms with high earnings growth have the ability to do so. Those arguments imply that the 
impact of abnormal accruals can be continued in the future. Xue (2004) also finds that the
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capital markets recognize the information content of earnings management and rationally 
price the signals in both the short term and the long term. From this point of view, there is 
no return reversal of parent firms in the long-run.
Previous studies have identified that spin-offs are favorable corporation events. 
Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) find positive post-event long-term abnormal 
returns for divesting firms and the firms they divest. Ahn and Denis (2004) found that a 
significant increase in measures of investment efficiency and the diversification discount 
is eliminated after spin-offs. Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997), Best, Best, and Agapos 
(1998), Nanda and Narayanan (1999), and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) argue 
that spin-offs alleviate information problems because markets are able to observe 
individual division cash flow more accurately. Chemmanur and Liu (2007) suggest that, 
in equilibrium, insiders with the most favorable private information are more likely to 
choose spin-offs when firms face high information production costs. Given the findings 
of performance improvement and information asymmetry reduction from prior studies, 
corporate spin-offs are more likely to be driven by the signaling motivation rather than 
managerial opportunism. Therefore,
H3a: Firms that adopt spin-offs have less incentive to manage abnormal accruals after 
spin-offs completion.
H3b: The long term return o f spin-offparent firms are positively correlated with the level
o f the pre-spin-offs abnormal accruals.
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2.3 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MEASUREMENT AND RETURNS
ESTIMATION
2.3.1 Earnings Management Estimation
Based on previous studies, I calculate abnormal accruals as the proxy for earnings 
management by using the following methodology.
The Jones Model is one of the most applied methods in literature to estimate the 
earnings management. Following Jones (1991) and Erickson and Wang (1999), I define 
abnormal accruals of parent firms are the residuals (Residaul J) from the estimation of 
the following model of
TAit = A 0 / 4 - . )  + AAREVit + p,PPEit + s„ (1)
where TAU is the total accruals of parent firm / at the ending of fiscal year t ; A i s  the 
total assets of parent firm i at the beginning of fiscal year t (COMPUSTAT item 6);
AREVjt is the change in revenues of parent firm i from year t-1 to year t (COMPUSTAT
item 12); PREit is the gross property plant of firm i at the ending of fiscal year t. In the 
equation (1), TAtl, AREVit and PREU are scaled by the 4,-i •
93For firms which announced spin-offs in 1988 or earlier, I calculated total 
accruals as following24:
23 Since operating cash flow o f firm (COMPUSTAT item 308) is not available prior to 1988 (SFAS N 0.95), 
I apply different methods to calculate the total accruals.
24 The estimation o f  total accruals is suggested by Zheng and Stangeland (2007).
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TA, = ACA, -  ACASH, -  ACL, + ACLD, + A TAXPU -  DEPit
Where AC A, = the change in current assets of parent firm i during year t (COMPUSTAT
item 4); A CASH, = the change in current cash of parent firm i during year
/yCOMPUSTAT item 1); ACL, = the change in current liabilities of parent firm i during
year t (COMPUSTAT item 5); ACLD, = the change in debt included in current liabilities
of parent firm i during year t (COMPUSTAT item 34); A CLD, = the change in taxes
payable of parent firm i during year t (COMPUSTAT item 71) and DEP„= the 
depreciation and amortization of parent firm i in year t.
For firms that announced spin-offs after 1988, the total accruals are calculated as 
follows:
TA, = Earnings, -  OCF,
Where Earnings u = income before extraordinary item of parent firm i in year t 
(COMPUSTAT item 237); OCF„ = operating cash flow of parent firm /' in year t 
(COMPUSTAT item 308) minus extraordinary items and discounted operations of parent 
firm i in year t (COMPUSTAT item 124).
Despite of the popularity of the Jones Model, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) 
have argued that Jones Model suffers from correlated omitted variables issues. Therefore, 
the abnormal accruals could be misspecified. They suggest that using a modified model 
of Jones could provide most power tests earnings management. Thus, I apply a modified
25 Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) argued that since revenues can be managed by firms through 
inflated credit sales, the parameter P2 should be corrected with the change in account receivables. See 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) p. 199 for detail discussion.
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version of the Jones Model applied by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) as the main measurement to estimate the abnormal 
accruals. The abnormal accruals of parent firms are the residuals (Residaul_MJ) from the 
estimation of the following model of
Where the ARECit = the change in accounts receivable of parent firm i during year t
(COMPUSTAT item 2), scaled by the Au_x . Prior studies (Subramanyam, 1996; Barua,
Legoria, and Moffitt, 2006) have documented that cross-sectional version of the Jones 
Model and modified-Jones Model is better than their time-series counterparts. In this 
study, I use pooled data to estimate abnormal accruals in both models.
The third measure I apply to represent the earning management is the industry- 
adjusted accruals (TACC_D) which is inspired by Zheng and Stangeland (2007). The 
TACCJD is defined as the total accruals of parent firms less the median total accruals of 
relevant industry (which has the same first two-digital SIC-code as parent firms) during 
the same periods. Therefore,
Where TAmt =medians of total accruals (deflated by total assets at beginning year t) for 
relevant industry M of parents at the ending of fiscal year t.
TA, = yx{\IAtt_x) + r 2[^REVu - ^ E C u]+n PPEu + (2)
TACC_D = TAit - TAMt (3)
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Healy and Wahlen (1999) suggest that the earnings management studies should 
report whether the observed effects of earnings management are attributable to a few 
firms or are pervasive. It implies that separating a sample firm by the sign of abnormal 
accruals may provide more meaningful results. Lim, Thong, and Ding (2007) have 
argued that the sign of the abnormal accruals matters. The decision of applying 
positive/negative or absolute values to the abnormal accruals depends on the design of 
the study concerning the management incentives. For example, Jones (1991) predicates 
that the unexpected accruals should be negative because she expected that firms would 
downplay earnings during import relief investigation. Lim, Thong, and Ding (2007) only 
focus on positive discretionaries since they believed that firms that issue SEOs are more 
likely to overstate earnings before the issuance. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) applies 
an absolute value of total accruals as the proxy of the earnings management since the 
objective of their study is to examine the relation between the degree of earnings 
manipulation and the CEO’s compensation. Based on the rationale of earnings 
management before spin-offs, I only focus on positive abnormal accruals spin-offs
Of tsample in this study.
2.3.2 Announcement and Long-Term Abnormal Returns Estimation
Abnormal returns around the spin-off announcement of parent firms are calculated 
by using the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) with the CRSP value- weighted
26 There is another way to deal with the sign o f the abnormal accruals. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) 
divided their IPOs sample by discretionary current accruals into“conservative” IPOs (most negative 
discretionary current accruals) to “aggressive” (most positive discretionary current accruals) IPOs (p. 1947- 
1948). Their result shows that almost half o f IPOs sample carrying negative discretionary current accruals 
in the issuance year. Although the findings are consistent with their predication across all sample firms, the 
rationale is lacked.
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index as the benchmark of the market portfolio. The estimated period is over a 255 
trading day period ending 5 trading days prior to the announcement day. Abnormal 
returns with several time intervals around announcement day for parent firms are 
examined. The average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the median cumulative 
abnormal returns are reported.
I also calculate the long term abnormal returns after spin-offs announcement. 
Monthly windows up to one, two and three year after spin-offs announcements are 
employed to estimate long-run abnormal stock returns. The estimated period is over a 60 
month period ending 13 months prior to the announcement day. Since long-run abnormal 
stock returns can be very sensitive to the performance benchmark and the procedure that 
is used (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), I apply a control firm 
method suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997) to estimate buy-and-hold (BHARs) long­
term abnormal returns. The long-run abnormal return is the difference between the raw 
return of a sample spin-offs firm and the raw return of a matched firm. The matched firm 
is the firm that has the same four-digit SIC codes as the parents sample and the market 
value is between 80% and 120% of the market value of the sample firm at the end of year 
prior to announcement year. If no such firm is found, then the three-digit SIC code is 
used followed by two-digit SIC and one-digit SIC code.
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2.4 SAMPLE SELECTION, SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND
ABNORMAL RETURNS
2.4.1 Data sources and requirements
Using the Thomas One Banker database (the former Deals Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database), I identify a sample of U.S. firms that undertook spin-offs 
during 1980-2006 period. The Thomas ONE Banker data includes the announcement 
dates and effective dates, the CUSIP identifiers and the tickers for parent and spun-off 
firms, transaction data and a brief description of the spin-off deals. To be included in our 
sample, those spin-offs must meet following criteria:
on1. Deals must be voluntary tax-free spin-offs. Any non-voluntary spin-offs such as 
those forced through anti-trust regulation and taxable distribution deals are 
excluded from the sample.
2. The spin-off is not part of liquidity, bankruptcy, or merger processing.
3. Financial firms’ spin-offs (parent firms with SIC code 6000-6999) are dropped 
from the sample.
27 Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a corporation to make a tax-free distribution to its 
shareholders o f stock and securities in one or more controlled subsidiaries.To be qualified for the tax-free 
treatment, firms must satisfy thefollowing requirements: (a) The distributing corporation must distribute the 
stock o f a controlled corporation (defined as owning at least 80% of the voting power and at least 80% o f  
the shares o f each class o f  non-voting stock), preexisting or newly created, to its shareholders, (b) The 
distributing corporation generally must distribute all its controlled corporation stock and securities 
immediately before the transaction, (c) Following the distribution, both the controlled and distributing 
corporations must be actively engaged in a trade or business with a five-year history, (d) Neither the 
distributing nor the controlled corporation can use the spin-off as a device for distributing earnings and 
profits, (e) A spin-off is to be motivated, in whole or substantial part, by one or more corporate business 
purposes. The purpose(s) must be real and substantial and germane to the distributing or controlled 
corporations business or to the affiliated group o f which the distributing corporation is a member, (f) 
Following the distribution o f the controlled corporations stock, the distributing corporation shareholders 
must maintain continuity o f  interest in both companies. Revenue procedure 96-30 further states this 
requirement generally is met if  one or more persons who directly or indirectly own the distributing 
corporation before the distribution also own 50% or more o f the stock in each o f the modified companies 
after the separation.
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4. The announcement and effective day of spin-offs must be identifiable through 
articles from Factiva.
5. Spin-off parent firms’ data must be available on the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), COMPUSTAT, and Compact Disclosure databases.
I use FACTIVA to identify detailed information about each spin-off deal and the 
Cleaning House’s Capital Changes Reporter (CCR) to determine each deal’s tax status. I 
collect price and return data from CRSP and financial analysts’ data from Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Annual accounting data includes segment 
information and executive compensation data from COMPUSTAT. Initially, I obtained 
766 spin-offs from Thomson ONE Banker. I excluded 127 records with unverified 
announcement dates through Wall Street Journal articles, 66 records with carve-out, 39 
records with taxable spin-offs, 11 records with non-voluntary spin-offs, 42 records 
combined with other corporate events (such as M&As and dividend announcements), 55
- jo
non-spin-off records , 98 records with parent firms operating in the financial industry, 21 
non-voluntary (regulation) records, 8 duplicate records, 5 foreign spin-offs records and 
54 records without accrual data. The final sample consists of 240 spin-offs divested by 
230 different companies from 1980-2006.29
2.4.2 Parent Firms Characteristics
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of spin-offs by year. More than 60% of the spin­
offs occurred between 1991 and 2000, with the highest 25 spin-offs in 2000, followed by
28 Those deals include split-up, tracking stock, leverage buyout, and sell-offs.
29 Eight firms have made two spin-offs and one firm has made three spin-offs.
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19 deals in 1995 and 1996. There are a total of 151 spin-offs where the operations of the 
parent firm and the spun-off subsidiaries differ at the two-digital SIC code level, and 79 
occur where the parent and spun-off subsidiaries have the same two-digit SIC codes.
Panel B reports the distribution of spin-offs by industry. Most of the spin-offs occur in 
manufacturing (43), followed by service (23) and business service (23).
[Insert Table 2.1 here]
Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample parent firms and 
transactions. The reported financial data in Panel A is based on end-of-fiscal-year 
information prior to the spin-off announcements. The average sales of sample firms are 
$5,536 billion, and the average book value of total assets of the sample parent firms is 
$7,266 billion. The mean and median market value of parent firms prior to the 
announcement year is $24.22 billion and $3.5 billion, respectively. In addition, the 
sample firms apply average 1.78 times more debt than equity to support their projects. In 
terms of profitability, the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are 2.34% 
and 7.49%, respectively, which indicate that on average parent firms are profitable prior 
to spin-offs. In terms of the level of diversification, spin-offs sample owns an average of 
three segments and the sales-based Herfindahl index is 0.6114. The mean and median 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) is 2.9534 and 2.0548, respectively.
[Insert Table 2.2 here]
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows information about the spin-off transaction. The 
transaction value is based on the market value of spin-off subsidiaries at the end of the 
first trading day and the spin-off size is the ratio of the spin-off transaction value to the 
market value of the parent firm one day prior to the effective day. The transaction value
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of spin-offs is around $1.094 billion dollars and the spun-off subsidiary represents 29.88 
% of the market value of parent firm’s capitalization. In general, the parents take an 
average of 203 days to complete the transaction.
Table 2.3 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample parent firms based on 
positive and negative accruals which is estimated by a modified Jones Model prior to the 
spin-offs announcement. The assets and sales levels of positive abnormal accruals parent 
firms are smaller than those of negative abnormal accruals parent firms, but the 
difference is not significant. Additionally, firms with pre-spin-offs positive abnormal 
accruals are significantly more profitable than those with pre-spin-offs negative abnormal 
accruals. It is noticed that there is no significant difference in the level of diversification 
and the M/B ratios between those two groups.
[Insert Table 2.3 here]
2.4.3 Abnormal returns around and after spin-offs announcements
Panel A of table2.4 reports the mean and median abnormal returns around the 
announcements of spin-offs. Similar to previous studies, I identify positive abnormal 
returns during spin-offs announcement period. A three-day window (-1, 1) has a 
significant mean cumulative abnormal return of 3.27%. Significant positive abnormal 
returns of 1.90% and 2.53% are also found on the announcement day and during the two- 
day window (-1, 0). There is no significant drift after the spin-off announcement.
[Insert Table 2.4 here]
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The long-term buy-and-hold returns are reported in Table 2.4. Panel B of table 2.4 
shows that the parents earn significant positive raw returns of 0.85%, 1.63% and 2.74% 
over the holding period o f one, two and three years, respectively. The abnormal returns of 
spin-offs after one, two, and three years are 0.24%, 0.49% and -0.69%, but not 
significantly different than 0. The findings confirm that the parent firms perform better 
after the spin-offs, but holding parent firms does not carry superior returns to investors, 
which are consistent to previous literature. Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) find 
both parents and spun-off units have positive abnormal returns in the three years after the 
event. However, the abnormal returns are limited to event firms (parents and spin-offs) 
that are acquired in mergers.
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2.5 ABNORMAL ACCRUALS AND ABNORMAL RETURNS
2.5.1 Abnormal Accrual Estimation Before and After Spin-Offs Announcements
Basing my approach, on the literature, I apply the abnormal accrual as the proxy 
of earnings management. Abnormal accruals of parent firms three years prior to a spin­
o ffs  announcement year (t) and three years after a spin-offs completion year (e) are 
reported in Table 2.5. Abnormal accruals are proxies by Residual_J, Residual_MJ, and 
TACC D. Residual J is calculated as the residuals of the Jones Model; Residual MJ is 
calculated as the residuals of the Modified Jones Model; and TACC_D is the industrial- 
adjusted total accruals. The results in Panel A of Table 2.5 indicate that no significant 
abnormal accruals are engaged before the spin-offs. However, the abnormal accruals are 
significant in some years after the spin-off completions. This result is surprising but is 
consistent with the findings from previous studies about insider and institutional holders’ 
transactions after spin-offs. Allen (2001) indicates that, if insiders have favorable 
information regarding a public subsidiary/parent and the information is not fully 
disclosed at the time of spin-offs, they are likely to hold the stocks with favorable 
information and sell other stocks, suggesting that managers may try to buy parents firms 
with low costs by lowering the earnings intentionally. Because the purpose of this study 
is to identify whether managers use income increasing to signal favorable information to 
markets or to overstate the earnings in order to fulfill their portfolios, it is reasonable to 
divide the whole sample into positive and negative abnormal accruals sub-samples. The 
mean and median of positive and negative abnormal accruals, Residual_MJ, of parents 
before and after spin-offs are reported in Panel B of Table 2.5. The abnormal accruals are
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significant at the year prior to the announcement year t for both positive and negative 
accrual samples. The same conclusion is also reached by using the other two abnormal 
accrual measurements, Residual_J and TACC_D, which are reported in Panel C and 
Panel D. These findings in Table 2.5 support the first hypothesis, which suggests that 
spin-off parents have tended to manage earnings before the announcement. The results 
also show those intentions of managing earnings have been significantly reduced after 
spin-offs, which is consistent with the hypothesis 3 a.
[Insert Table 2.5 here]
2.5.2 Abnormal Accrual and Abnormal Returns Around Spin-Offs Announcements
Table 2.6 presents the abnormal returns around spin-off announcements based on 
the sample of positive accruals. The firms in the positive accrual sample indicate 
significant returns during the announcement period, no matter what proxy is applied. The 
abnormal returns during a three-day window (-1, 1) are between 2.4% to 2.68%.
However, the returns decline during day 6 to day 30. The returns are significantly 
negative, 3.56% to 4.31 %, during this period, depending on which proxy abnormal 
accrual is applied. Such negative returns could be attributed by the selling pressure from 
investors who want to sell stocks before the spin-off completions.
[Insert Table 2.6 here]
According to the opportunistic hypothesis and signaling hypothesis, the higher 
levels of earnings management should result in higher abnormal returns. I examine this 
possibility by separating the sample by the level of abnormal accruals. The results are 
shown in Table 2.7. This table indicates that the firms with the most positive abnormal
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accruals (Q4) earn a higher abnormal return around announcements compared to other 
abnormal accruals groups, although the difference is not significant. The only significant 
difference in return occurs during days 6 to 30. The returns of the group with the highest 
abnormal accruals exceed those of the group with the lowest positive abnormal accruals 
with a mean of 7.85% and a median 5.55%.
[Insert Table 2.7 here]
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2.6 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SPIN-OFFS’ STOCK 
PERFORMANCE AND ABNORMAL ACCRUALS
2.6.1 Event-Time Cross-Sectional Regressions
To examine the incremental influence of the abnormal accrual variables on spin­
off announcement returns, I conduct a cross-sectional regression to investigate this issue. 
The three-day window (-1,1) returns around spin-off announcements are regressed on the 
three abnormal accruals (Residual_MJl, ResidualJl and TACC_D) and a set of control 
variables for other known potential predictions in one cross-sectional regression. The 
earnings management proxy applied in the regressions is the abnormal accruals 
calculated at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement year. The control 
variables considered in the regression models are market-to-book ratio (M/B), target 
estimated market-to-book ratio (TM/B), debt/equity ratio (D/E), return on assets (ROA), 
sales-based Herfindahl index (HERFINDAHL), leverage level (LEVERAGE), and 
financial analysts’ forecast error (ERROR).
Prior studies (Nanda and Narayanan, 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 
1999; Chemmanur and Liu, 2007) have documented that the firms that are more likely to 
engage in corporate spin-offs are those firms undervalued relative to their peer industry, 
implying that the lower M/B parents are more likely to earn higher returns during the 
announcements due to “unlocking the hidden value.” On the other hand, M/B ratio can be 
viewed as the proxy of the future growth perspective based on the Q theory. In this case, 
the higher growth perspective firms that adopt spin-offs should be good news to the 
market. Consequently, the sign is unknown. ROA is applied to control the level of
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earnings of parent firms before spin-off, as suggested by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1995) and Kasznik (1999).
I also apply TM/B as the valuation of the spun-off units. If the parent firm tends 
to give investors the divisions’ stocks that are highly overvalued, then investors should 
discount the managers’ spin-offs decisions. D/E ratio is applied to control the 
bondholders’ wealthy expropriation effect, an approach which is advocated by Galai and 
Masulis (1976), Parrino (1997), and Maxwell and Rao (2003). This approach implies that 
firms that have a higher level of D/E ratio could increase their borrowing capacity by 
adopting spin-offs to transfer debts to spun-off divisions, thereby improving firms’ 
capital constraint. LEVERAGE is applied to control whether firms suffer financial 
distress before spin-offs. Chemmanur and Liu (2007) suggest that spin-off parents are 
more likely to be firms with profitability and high cash flow realization in the future. 
Therefore, I predict that the abnormal returns are positively correlated with profitability 
but are negatively related to the level of financial leverage. HERFINDAHL is applied to 
identify the level of diversification. Since focus-increasing spin-offs can improve firms’ 
operating performance (Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999) or 
reduce diversification discount (Burch and Nanda, 2003), I expect the more diversified 
firms earn higher returns during the announcement period. I also include the ERROR in 
the regression because studies (Nanda and Narayanan, 1999; Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999) have documented the positive relation between the level of 
information asymmetry and the spin-offs’ abnormal returns.
The results of cross-sectional regressions and their statistics are reported in Table
2.8. All the variables in the regressions lthrough 3 indicate that the M/B ratios show the
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expected signs. The coefficient of the abnormal accruals, which is expressed by 
Residual_MJ, is 0.20 and significant at the 5% or 10 % level. The findings support 
hypothesis 2, which states that the spin-off announcement returns are positively 
correlated with the pre-spin-off abnormal accruals. These findings are consistent with the 
findings of previous earnings management studies. Subramanyam (1996) finds abnormal 
accruals are positively associated with future profitability. Louis and Robinson (2005) 
also identify a significant positive correlation between the level of discretionary accrual 
and stock returns by using stock-split as the sample.
[Insert Table 2.8 here]
Consistent with the focus-increasing hypothesis, the coefficient of 
HERFINDAHL is significant at 5% or 10% in regressions 1-3 and is negatively 
correlated with abnormal returns, implying that the gains of spin-offs could be 
contributed by the level of diversification reduction. I also find that the market valuation 
of spun-off divisions has a strong negative influence on the announcement returns. The 
coefficient is -0.02 and is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of LEVERAGE is 
negatively correlated with the abnormal returns, which is consistent with the prediction of 
Chemmanur and Liu (2007), who argue that the firms that do not have better growth 
perspective or suffer financial distress are constrained to adopt spin-offs. Instead, they 
could maintain the same structure or try to sell out part of their assets. The regression 
models also indicate that higher levels of D/E ratio will result in higher announcement 
returns, but the effect is not significant, implying that managers could be restricted to 
transfer their debt to the spun-off units in order to increase future borrowing capability. 
For example, Parrino (1997) found that, even though the gains of stockholders are
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transferred from bondholders in the Marriott’s spin-off case, the managers faced lawsuits 
from bondholders who wanted to block this transaction due to their wealth lost.
Conversely, in regression 1, the influence of the M/B of parents is positive but 
insignificant on the announcement returns. Moreover, ROA is positively related with the 
abnormal returns but is insignificant. These results could be caused by the upward 
earnings management. McNicholes (2000) has argued that the firms with greater 
expected earnings growth are likely to have greater accruals than those with less expected 
earnings growth. It could be the reason that the ROA does not provide extra explanatory 
power in our model.
Overall, the regression statistics for regressions 1 -3  show that the model is 
adequately specified. The F-statistics for regression fit is significant at the 5% level. I 
repeat the same analysis in regressions 4 through 9 by using the other two abnormal 
accrual variables. Consistent with our predication, all the abnormal accrual variables are 
significantly positively correlated with the abnormal returns. Those regression results 
provide strong support that managers who engage in spin-offs are more likely to overstate 
their earnings before the event, and such positive abnormal accruals are positively 
correlated with the abnormal returns around announcements.
2.6.2 Long-term Cross-Sectional Regressions
Although a positive relation between the level of abnormal accruals and the 
abnormal returns around announcements is found, it cannot distinguish whether the 
earnings inflation is triggered by managerial opportunism or managerial optimism 
because such a positive relation is consistent with the prediction of both hypotheses
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(Guay, Kothari, and Watts, 1996). Therefore, I examine the relation between long-term 
returns and the level of accruals to see whether there is a return reversal in after-corporate 
spin-offs.
Several cross-sectional regressions are examined to investigate this issue. The 
one- year, monthly (+1, +12), buy-and-hold returns after spin-off announcements are 
regressed on the abnormal accrual variables calculated at the end of the fiscal year prior 
to the announcement year. I include several control variables in the regression models: 
M/B, D/E, HERFINDAHL, and ERROR, which are addressed in Section 6.1. Another 
set of control variables are also included in the long-term return regressions suggested by 
the literature: percent of institutional holders prior to the spin-offs (INST), number of 
financial analysts who report forecasts for parents (NUMBER) and the median estimate 
of long-term earnings growth (MEDIAN).
Furthermore, the role of institutional holders in corporate events has been 
documented by several studies. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that institutional 
investors can help to alleviate agency problems in firms and pressure managers to 
improve performance. Cheng, DeFond, and Park (2002) argue that the pressure of 
institutional holders can reduce the level of earnings management. Therefore, I predict 
the level of institutional ownership that serves as an instrument to monitor managerial 
opportunism should be positively correlated with the long-term returns of parent firms. In 
addition, I apply MEDIAN as a proxy of the future growth perspective and NUMBER to 
express the forecast coverage.
The results of cross-sectional regressions and their statistics are reported in Table
2.9. Regressions 1 through 3 show that the abnormal accruals are positively correlated
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with the Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns but are not significant (significant only at 10% 
when applying Residual_J as the abnormal accrual proxy). This finding partially 
supports hypothesis H3b, which states that the abnormal accruals before corporate spin­
offs are positively correlated with the long-term returns. There are several reasons why 
significant results cannot be obtained. First, the persistence of abnormal accruals could be 
discounted after spin-offs since spin-off parents are required to report additional 
information such as the proxy statement to the Security Exchange Committee (SEC) in 
order to obtain tax-free spin-off approval. The transparent disclosure could alleviate the 
information problem, thereby reducing the power of the earnings management as the 
signaling. Furthermore, the holding period returns after the spin-off announcements could 
be strongly influence by the selling pressure from insiders or institutional holders due to 
the nature of the spin-off design. Even though parent firms have better growth 
perspective, institutional investors are forced to trade these holding stocks before the 
effective day if they do not intent to hold spun-off divisions. Those behaviors could 
increase the volatility of the returns, thereby reducing signaling power. Both reasons 
could cause the insignificant results in our long-term regression model.
[Insert Table 2.9 here]
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Prior studies have indicated that managers tend to manipulate earnings before 
corporate events. Nonetheless, earnings management can be used to convey a manager’s 
private information to outside shareholders. Both effects could result in a positive 
correlation between the level of abnormal accruals and the abnormal returns around 
corporate events. On the other hand, the relation between the abnormal accruals and the 
long-term returns should be different, indicating a positive correction between earnings 
management and long-term returns by managerial optimism and a negative relation 
between those by managerial opportunism.
In this study, I investigate whether managers increase their earnings before 
corporate spin-offs. By using a sample of 240 spin-offs during 1980 to 2006,1 find that 
firms adopting corporate spin-offs tend to “manage” their earnings before the spin-off 
announcements. The intentions of managing earnings are significantly reduced after the 
spin-offs. I also find a significant positive relation between the spin-offs announcement 
and the abnormal accruals, which indicates that the announcement returns of spin-offs are 
partially caused by the pre-spin-offs earnings management.
In terms of motives behind the pre-spin-off earnings management, the results 
marginally support the signaling hypothesis, which predicates a positive relation between 
the level of earnings management and long-term returns. Such results could be attributed 
to significant information production after spin-offs and the nature of the design of the 
corporate spin-offs.
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Completed M &A 1980-2005 Completed Divestitures 1980-2005
No. of 
Deals














1980 1,560 32.9 1,456 93.3% 27.8 84.5% 104 6.7% 5.1 15.5%
1981 2,329 70.1 1,853 79.6% 59.9 85.4% 476 20.4% 10.2 14.6%
1982 2,298 60.7 1,736 75.5% 52.3 86.2% 562 24.5% 8.4 13.8%
1983 2,391 52.7 1,730 72.4% 39.8 75.5% 661 27.6% 12.9 24.5%
1984 3,164 126.1 2,373 75.0% 95.6 75.8% 791 25.0% 30.5 24.2%
1985 3,437 145.5 2,409 70.1% 102.1 70.2% 1,028 29.9% 43.4 29.8%
1986 4,381 204.9 2,986 68.2% 132.5 64.7% 1,395 31.8% 72.4 35.3%
1987 3,920 177.2 2,728 69.6% 119.7 67.6% 1,192 30.4% 57.5 32.4%
1988 3,041 302.2 1,708 56.2% 183.6 60.8% 1333 43.8% 118.6 39.2%
1989 3,850 330.9 2,168 56.3% 234.9 71.0% 1,682 43.7% 96.0 29.0%
1990 4,344 212.1 2,370 54.6% 121.9 57.5% 1,974 45.4% 90.2 42.5%
1991 3,619 148.4 1,790 49.5% 89.6 60.4% 1,829 50.5% 58.8 39.6%
1992 3,778 130.9 2,043 54.1% 71.6 54.7% 1,735 45.9% 59.3 45.3%
1993 4,200 193.3 2,242 53.4% 100.4 51.9% 1,958 46.6% 92.9 48.1%
1994 5,013 299.3 2,944 58.7% 174.0 58.1% 2,069 41.3% 125.3 41.9%
1995 6,301 437.7 3,857 61.2% 245.8 56.2% 2,444 38.8% 191.9 43.8%
1996 7,347 563.0 4,651 63.3% 373.3 66.3% 2,696 36.7% 189.7 33.7%
1997 8,479 771.5 5,707 67.3% 558.5 72.4% 2,772 32.7% 213.0 27.6%
1998 10,193 1,373.8 7,262 71.2% 1,071.7 78.0% 2,931 28.8% 302.1 22.0%
1999 9,173 1,422.9 7,442 81.1% 1,133.8 79.7% 1,731 18.9% 289.1 20.3%
2000 8,853 1,781.6 6,308 71.3% 1,410.3 79.2% 2,545 28.7% 371.3 20.8%
2001 6,296 1,155.8 3,940 62.6% 904.4 78.2% 2,356 37.4% 251.4 21.8%
2002 5,497 625.0 3,346 60.9% 324.5 51.9% 2,151 39.1% 300.5 48.1%
2003 5,959 521.5 3,579 60.1% 311.8 59.8% 2,380 39.9% 209.7 40.2%
2004 7,031 857.1 4,631 65.9% 579.3 67.6% 2,400 34.1% 277.8 32.4%
2005 7,298 980.8 4,839 66.3% 673.1 68.6% 2,459 33.7% 307.7 31.4%
Source: Mergers & Acquisitions, May/June 1989; March/April 1998; March/April 2005
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1980 1,456 104 27.8 5.1
1981 1,853 27% 476 358% 59.9 115% 10.2 100%
1982 1,736 -6% 562 18% 52.3 -13% 8.4 -18%
1983 1,730 0% 661 18% 39.8 -24% 12.9 54%
1984 2,373 37% 791 20% 95.6 140% 30.5 136%
1985 2,409 2% 1,028 30% 102.1 7% 43.4 42%
1986 2,986 24% 1,395 36% 132.5 30% 72.4 67%
1987 2,728 -9% 1,192 -15% 119.7 -10% 57.5 -21%
1988 1,708 -37% 1,333 12% 183.6 53% 118.6 106%
1989 2,168 27% 1,682 26% 234.9 28% 96.0 -19%
1990 2,370 9% 1,974 17% 121.9 -48% 90.2 -6%
1991 1,790 -24% 1,829 -7% 89.6 -26% 58.8 -35%
1992 2,043 14% 1,735 -5% 71.6 -20% 59.3 1%
1993 2,242 10% 1,958 13% 100.4 40% 92.9 57%
1994 2,944 31% 2,069 6% 174.0 73% 125.3 35%
1995 3,857 31% 2,444 18% 245.8 41% 191.9 53%
1996 4,651 21% 2,696 10% 373.3 52% 189.7 -1%
1997 5,707 23% 2,772 3% 558.5 50% 213.0 12%
1998 7,262 27% 2,931 6% 1,071.7 92% 302.1 42%
1999 7,442 2% 1,731 -41% 1,133.8 6% 289.1 -4%
2000 6,308 -15% 2,545 47% 1,410.3 24% 371.3 28%
2001 3,940 -38% 2,356 -7% 904.4 -36% 251.4 -32%
2002 3,346 -15% 2,151 -9% 324.5 -64% 300.5 20%
2003 3,579 7% 2,380 11% 311.8 -4% 209.7 -30%
2004 4,631 29% 2,400 1% 579.3 86% 277.8 32%
2005 4,839 4% 2,459 2% 673.1 16% 307.7 11%
Source: Mergers & Acquisitions, May/June 1989; March/April 1998; March/April 2005
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 1.1: Number Transaction and Value of Corporation Spin-offs in U.S. From 
1980-2006
Announcement Num ber o f  _  IV  . % o f Num ber o f Total % o f  Value o f  Total
Year Deals u ea l valu e M il) Spin-offs Deals Spin-offs Deals
1980 2 289.50 0.26% 0.04%
1981 1 722.00 0.13% 0.10%
1982 4 343.50 0.52% 0.05%
1983 18 3,833.10 2.35% 0.51%
1984 15 229.30 1.96% 0.03%
1985 22 1,861.00 2.88% 0.25%
1986 32 4,468.50 4.18% 0.60%
1987 24 4,516.10 3.14% 0.61%
1988 33 9,562.00 4.31% 1.28%
1989 26 8,932.00 3.40% 1.20%
1990 35 5,742.90 4.58% 0.77%
1991 14 4,270.50 1.83% 0.57%
1992 34 17,697.50 4.44% 2.38%
1993 33 16,088.20 4.31% 2.16%
1994 32 27,763.80 4.18% 3.73%
1995 50 98,723.80 6.54% 13.26%
1996 46 20,803.20 6.01% 2.80%
1997 49 79,720.20 6.41% 10.71%
1998 57 42,838.40 7.45% 5.76%
1999 48 81,468.60 6.27% 10.95%
2000 58 111,595.40 7.58% 14.99%
2001 21 38,344.90 2.75% 5.15%
2002 21 4,008.60 2.75% 0.54%
2003 33 27,266.70 4.31% 3.66%
2004 22 25,238.10 2.88% 3.39%
2005 25 65,691.30 3.27% 8.83%
2006 10 42,276.30 1.31% 5.68%
Total 765 744,295.40 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Thomson ONE Banker
















Abnormal Returns CAR Event-Window
Kudla and Mclnish (1976) 1972-1976 6  voluntary spin-offs market-model - Week (-46,46)
Hite and Owers (1983) 1963-1981 123 voluntary spin-offs market-model 1 .0 0 %***
3.3%***
day 0  
days (-1 ,0 )
Schipper and Smith (1983) 1963-1981 93 voluntary spin-offs market-model 2.84%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) 1963-1980 55 spin-offs mean-adjusted 3.34%*** days (0 ,1 )
Rosenfeld (1984) 1963-1981 35 large spin-offs mean-adjusted 5.56%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Copeland, Lemgruber and Mayers (1987) 1962-1981 188 spin-offs market-model and 
mean-adjusted 3.01%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Kudla and Mclnish (1988) 1972-1981 39 spin-offs market-model 3.29%* week 0
Seifert and Rubin (1989) 1968-1983 51 spin-offs market-model 3.26%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Johnson, Brown and Johnson (1994) 1980-1991 113 voluntary spin-offs market-model 3.42%*** day 0
Vijh (1994) 1964-1990 113 spin-offs market-model 2.90%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Michaely and Shawc (1995) 1981-1988 9 spin-offs market-model 2.43%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) 1980-1991 37 spin-offs market-model 1.32%** days (-1 ,0 )
Seward and Walsh (1996) 1972 -1987 78 voluntary spin-offs market-model 2.60%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) 1975-1991 85 voluntary spin-offs market-model 3.40%*** days ( - 1 ,0 )
Best. Best and Agapos (1998) 1979-1993 72 spin-offs market-model 3.41%*** days (-1 , 1)
Desai and Jain (1999) 1975-1991 144 spinoffs market-model 3.84%*** days (-1 , 1)
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 1979-1993 118 spinoffs market-model 3.15%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Wruck amd Wruck (2001) 1985-1995 172 spin-offs market-model 3.58% NS days (-1 ,0 )
Houge and Wellman (2001) 1990-1996 70 spin-offs market-model 2 .2 0 %*** day 0
Maxwell and Rao(2003) 1976-1997 79 spin-offs market-model 2.89%*** days (-1 ,0 )
Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy (2003) 1980-1996 169 spin-offs market-model 2.83%*** day 0
Wheatley and Brown and Johnson (2005) 1978-1993 160 voluntary spin-offs market-model 3.70%*** day 0
Notes:
1. CAR = Cumulative abnormal returns using the market model approach
2. Day 0 signify the press announcement day
3. Days (-1,0) signify a two-day return window from day -1  through day 0.
4.*** Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 1% level; N/S significant data not stated
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Table 1.3: Sample Selection Process
Initial Sample (1980~2006) 765
Announcement data cannot be identified 127
IPO (Carve out) 66
Taxable sp in-off 39
Bankrupt, liquidity and lawsuit 11
Takeover, m erger o f  target and m erger o f parent 42
Not a sp in-off deal 55
Financial industry sp in-off 98
Regulated spin-off 21
Foreign parent firms 5
Repeated deal 8
Data unavailable 30 502
Final Sample 263











Table 1.4: Time Profile of Sample Spin-offs
Distribution o f  a sample of 254 parent firms that completed 263 spin-off deals during the period 1980-2006, by announcement year, multi/single segments, and 
exchange listing. The number o f  spin-off is the number o f spin-off deals distributed by announcement year as identified by articles from Factiva. Number o f  
parent firms is the number o f announcement spin-off parent firms during this period. Single/Multi-segment parent firm is defined as whether a parent firm 
operates one or more than one segments in announcement year. The segment data is identified by Compustat Segment Database Cross-industry/ Own-industry 
Spin-offs is defined as whether parent firm has the same first 2-digit SIC codes as the spin-off units. The SIC codes data is obtained from the COMPUSTAT. 















1981 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1982 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1983 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0
1984 6 5 0 5 3 3 3 1 2
1985 8 8 0 8 8 0 8 0 0
1986 9 9 1 8 8 1 7 2 0
1987 4 4 0 4 3 1 2 1 1
1988 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 0 3
1989 6 6 2 4 1 5 5 0 1
1990 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7 0 3
1991 6 6 0 6 5 1 3 2 1
1992 13 13 2 11 8 5 5 3 5
1993 15 15 1 14 1 1 4 1 1 1 3
1994 1 0 9 1 8 6 4 5 1 4
1995 23 23 5 18 15 8 19 1 3
1996 2 0 17 3 14 1 2 8 1 2 1 7
1997 14 13 5 8 7 7 1 1 1 2
1998 2 1 2 0 7 13 9 1 2 1 1 0 1 0
1999 19 18 1 17 14 5 17 1 1
2 0 0 0 2 0 19 1 18 1 0 1 0 13 0 7
2 0 0 1 9 9 0 9 6 3 5 1 3
2 0 0 2 9 9 2 7 4 5 6 0 3
2003 1 0 1 0 1 9 6 4 5 0 5
2004 5 5 0 5 1 4 4 0 1
2005 8 8 0 8 6 2 8 0 0
2006 2 2 0 2 1 1 2 0 0











Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Companies
This table provides selected descriptive statistics for parent firms and their matching industries. Panel A is calculated from the COMPUSTAT and Compact Disclosure databases. 
All variables and ratios are for the parent firms and their matching industries in the fiscal year ending prior to the announcement year. The matching industry is defined as the 
industry with the same 4-digit SIC with parents in the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. If such industry is not found, or the number of firms in an industry is less 
than five, then subsequent matching will be done at the three digit, two digit or one digit. Those variables and ratios for the industry is calculated as a weighted average using a 
firm’s reported total assets as the weight. The market capitalization of parents is the market value of equity of the parent firm as the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. 
Debt/Equity is the ratio o f the book value of total debt to the book value of common equity. The current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Leverage is 
measured as the ratio o f long-term and short-term debt to book value o f assets. Operating income/ Total assets is defined as sales minus the cost of good sold, sales and general 
administration, and working capital change, divided by the book value of assets. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of assets. ROE is the ratio 
of income before extraordinary items to the book value of common equity. The number of segments is obtained from the COMPUSTAT segment database and is the number of 
business segment o f parent firms in the fiscal year prior to announcement year. The sales-based Herfindahl index calculated across n business segments as the sum of the squares 
of each segment's sales as a proportion of total sales of parent firms in the fiscal year prior to announcement year. The results of the t-statistics for the difference in the mean 
between the parents and the industry average, and the results of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for the difference in the median between the parents and industry average, as 
specified in the panel. In Panel B, the transaction value and days to completion are from the SDC database. The transaction value is the market value of spun-off subsidiaries at the 
end of the first trading day. Days to completion is the number of days between announcement and effective date. Spin-off size is the ratio o f transaction value to the market value 
of parent firm one day prior to effective day.
Panel A: Selected characteristics of parent firms and their matching industries prior to spin-offs
Parent Firm___________  Matching Industry__________   Difference (Parent-Industry)
Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Difference Median Difference
Sales ($MM) 5348.37 1425.82 13478.37 61952.57 16621.05 161874.22 -56604.2 *** -15195.23 ***
Total Assets ($MM) 7005.71 1432.00 22345.82 76605.57 16981.58 195984.49 -69599.86 *** -15549.58 ♦**
Net Income (SMM) 248.82 37.12 1337.50 3494.11 650.80 12898.24 -3245.29 *** -613.68 ***
Market Capitalization (SMM) 23089.16 3379.74 72004.58 12740.50 4520.92 21215.03 10348.66 *** -1141.18
Debt/Equity 1.96 1.37 2.13 2.64 1.81 4.80 -0.68 ** -0.44 ***
Current Ratio (%) 212.00 116.43 216.45 192.71 173.62 94.18 19.29 -57.19
Leverage (%) 26.38 25.70 16.75 26.44 26.40 11.40 -0.06 -0.7
Operation Income/ Total Assets (%) 12.17 13.61 12.38 14.23 13.62 6.22 -2.06 *** -0.01 *
ROA (%) 2.00 3.35 10.76 3.13 3.37 4.61 -1.13 * -0.02
ROE (%) 5.79 10.61 40.90 9.19 8.77 19.00 -3.4 1.84
Number of Segments 3.05 3.00 1.59 3.81 2.43 3.06 -0.76 *** 0.57 ***
Sales-based Herfindahl 0.62 0.54 0.27 0.77 0.75 0.81 -0.15 ** -0.21 **
Panel B: Deal characteristics
Mean Median Std. Dev
Transaction Value (SMM) 870.02 181.12 1939.15
Spin-off Size (%) 28.641 15.03 47.73
Days to Completion 209.44 191.00 178.97
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% *Significant at 10% oo
On
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Table 1.6: Abnormal Returns around Spin-offs Announcements for Sample Parent 
Firms
Cumulative abnormal returns over selected intervals for a sample o f 263 firms that completed spin-offs 
during the period 1980-2006. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated 
over a 255-day period ending 5 days before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is 
used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are cumulated in the intervals. The 
percentage positive is the ratio o f the number of firms with positive abnormal returns to the total number of 
firms. The generalized sign test is used to test the significance o f the percentage o f firms with positive 
abnormal returns.
Interval
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents
Mean % t-statistic Median % Percentage Positive
-30 to - 6 -0.37% -0.339 -0 .6 6 % 48.28%
-5 to -1 1.06% 2.167** -0.03% 49.80%
-1  to 0 2.61% 8.413*** 1.95% 69.50%***
0 2.05% 9.330*** 1.46% 67.30%***
- 1  to + 1 3.52% 9 2 4 9 *** 2.63% 68.82%***
+1 to +5 0 .8 8 % 1.800* -0.03% 49.80%
+ 6  t o +30 -1.70% -1.549 -1.25% 42.58%
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% *Significant at 10%











Table 1.7: Mean and Median of Misvaluation of Parents and Spun-off Subsidiaries
These are the summary statistics of the M/B ratio for a sample o f firms that completed a spin-off in the period 1980 - 2006 and its industry and specified- 
industries. The pre-spin-off M/B ratio o f  parent firms is the ratio o f market equity at the end o f December o f announcement year t -  1 divided by the book 
common equity for the fiscal year t-1. The pre-spin-off M/B ratio o f  spun-off subsidiaries is the ratio o f  the estimated market equity in announcement year t — 1, 
divided by the book common equity for the fiscal year ending in announcement year t - 1  .The estimated market equity o f  spun-off subsidiaries is equal to the 
spun-off subsidiary’s accounting sale multiplied by its matching specified-firm industry median ratio o f  capital to accounting sale minus its book value o f  debt. 
The numbers given are all for the announcement year t -  1. The M/B ratio o f the industry (specified-firm industry average) for pre-spin-offs is the median o f ratio 
o f market equity at the end o f December o f  announcement year t - 1 ,  divided by book common equity for the fiscal year ending in announcement year t -  1 in 
each matching industry (specified-firm industry). The M/B ratio o f  industry (specified-firm industry ) for post-spin-offs is the median o f the ratio o f  market 
equity at the end o f December o f  effective year e + 1, divided by the book common equity for the fiscal year ending in effective year e + 1 in each matched 
industry (specified-firm industry). The results o f  the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for the difference in the means, and Median scores test for the 
difference in the medians between sample parents/ spun-off subsidiaries and industry average are reported. Respectively, *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Panel A: Level o f  Before-and -A fter Event Misvaluation for Sample Parents and Matching Industry Average
Variables Sample Parent Firms (1) Specified-fiim Industry (2) Industry (3) Difference/!) - (3) Difference (1) - (2)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
M/B Ratio-Pre-Spinoffs 3.2450 2.2044 4.7444 2.9057 3.5490 2.6612 -0.3040 -0.4568** -1.4994*** -0.7013***
M/B Ratio-Post-Spinoffs 3.8333 2.4242 4.6548 2.9652 4.1952 2.6272 -0.3619 -0.2030 -0.8215** -0.5410***
Differemce: Post M/B-Pre M/B 0.5883 0.2198* - . . _ - . _ _
Panel B: Level o f Before-and-After-Event Misvaluation for Sample Spun-off Subsidiaries and Matching Industry Average
Variables Sample Spun-off Subsidiaries (1) Specified-firm Industry (2) Industry (3) Difference (1) - (3) Difference (1) - (2)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
M/B Ratio-Pre-Spinoffs 7.3424 2.7016 4.6860 2.9765 3.6922 2.7973 3.6502*** -0.0957 2.6564*** -0.2749
M/B Ratio-Post-Spinoffs 3.0030 2.0080 4.5809 3.0283 3.8932 2.7954 -0.8902*** -0.7874*** -1.5779*** -1.0203***












Table 1.8: Degree of Misvaluation of Sample Parent Firms and Announced Abnormal Returns of Parents
This table reports the abnormal returns for a sample o f 254 firms that completed a spin-off in the period 1980-2006, sorted based on the level o f industry-adjusted 
misvaluation. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 255-day period ending 5 days before the announcement date. 
The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are the cumulative abnormal returns measured over the 
interval (-1, 0), (0,0) and (-1,1).N represents the number o f observations in each category. The results o f the t-statistics for the difference in the mean abnormal 
returns between the relevant groups, and the results o f  the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for the difference in the median abnormal returns between the relevant 
groups are specified in the panel.
Variable
Quartile 1 





M/B Ratio-Parents vs. Industry
(-1 ,0 ) Mean 4.54% 3.81% 2.63% 2.04% 2.5%*
Median 4.08% 3.01% 2.41% 1.33% 2.75%**
N 64 63 63 64
(0 ,0 ) Mean 3.89% 3.06% 1 .2 0 % 1.74% 2.15%*
Median 3.24% 2.78% 1.09% 0.96% 2.28%*
N 64 63 63 64
(-1 ,1 ) Mean 4.52% 4.31% 3.82% 3.65% 0.87%
Median 4.90% 3.47% 3.36% 2.25% 2.65%**
N 64 63 63 64












Table 1.9: Degree of Misvaluation of Sample Spun-off Divisions and Announced Abnormal Returns of Parents
This table reports the abnormal returns for a sample o f  254 firms that completed 263 spin-offs in the period 1980-2006, sorted based on the level o f  industry- 
adjusted misvaluation. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 255-day period ending 5 days before the 
announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to compute the betas. The abnormal returns are the cumulative abnormal 
returns measured over the interval (-1, 0), (0 ,0 ) and ( - 1 ,1).N represents the number o f observations in each category. The results o f  the t-statistics for difference 
in the mean abnormal returns between the relevant groups, and the results o f  the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for the difference in the median abnormal returns 
between the relevant groups are specified in the panel.
Variable
Quartile 1 





M/B Ratio-Spunoff Subsidiaries vs. Industry
(-1,0) Mean 4.06% 3.17% 3.42% 2.31% 1.75%
Median 2.92% 2.51% 2.70% 1.69% 1.23%
N 49 50 50 48
(0 ,0 ) Mean 3.10% 2 .8 8 % 1.94% 1.83% 1.27%
Median 2.48% 1.82% 1.37% 1 .2 1 % 1.27%
N 49 50 50 48
(-1 , 1) Mean 5.39% 3.86% 4.47% 2.18% 3.21%*
Median 4.62% 3.26% 3.39% 3.06% 1.56%
N 49 50 50 48












Table 1.10: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Announcement Returns on Misvaluation Measurement
This table reports the abnormal announcement returns on pre-spin-offs misvaluation of firms that completed a spin-off in the period 1980-2006. The dependent variable is the mean 
three-day cumulative abnormal return generated over the interval (-1, +1). The cumulative abnormal return around the spin-off announcement o f parent firms are calculated by 
using the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) with the CRSP value- weighted index as the benchmark of the market portfolio. The estimated period is over a 255 trading day 
period ending 5 trading days prior to the announcement day. All the explanatory variables except for SD and N_IPOs are calculated from the annual data at the end of fiscal year 
prior to the spin-offs announcement year. The pre-spin-off M/B ratio of parent firms is the ratio of market equity in the last month of the year divided by the book common equity. 
The pre-spin-off M/B ratio of spun-off subsidiaries is the ratio of the estimated market divided by the book common equity. The estimated market equity of spun-off subsidiaries is 
equal to the spun-off subsidiary’s accounting sale multiplied by its matching specified-firm industry median ratio of capital to accounting sale minus its book value of debt. D/E is 
the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of common equity. FOCUS dummy is defined as 1 when the parent and the spun-off division have different first 2-digit 
SIC codes and 0 otherwise. HERFINDAHL is the sales-based Herfindahl index which is calculated across n business segments as the sum of the squares o f each segment's sales as 
a proportion o f total sales of parent firms. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of assets. N_IPOs is the number o f IPOs in the industries of 
spun-off divisions. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. Respectively, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Predicted sign Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6
Intercept 0.047 0.036
0.038 0.023 0.036 0.042
(7.083) (2.21) (2.27) (1.550) (1.98) (2.36)
M/B
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003
(-2.713)***: (-2.89) *** (-2.38) *** (-2.557)*** (-0.20) (-1.61)**
TM/B +/- -0.00003 -0.00004(-0.35) (-0.48)
DE i 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.003T (1.70)** (2.32) *** (0.87) (1.14)
FOCUS 0.009 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.005T (0.86) (0.92) (0.386) (0.88) (0.42)
HERFINDAHL -0.003 -0.014 -0.020 -0.003
(-0.16) (-0.75) (-0.94) (-0.16)
ROA + 0.001(1.715)**
SD X -0.012 0.373 0.145T (-0.72) (1.266)* (2.87) ***
N JPO s - -0.000837(-0.455)
F  Statistics 7.358 *** 2.800 *** 2.250 ** 2.436 *** 1.92 ** 0.710
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.027 0.026 0.037 0.029 -0.007
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Table 2.1: Time Profile of Sample Spin-offs
Panel A reports the distribution o f a sample o f 230 parent firms that completed 240 spin-off deals during 
the period 1980-2006, by announcement year and multi/single segments. The number o f spin-off is the 
number o f spin-off deals distributed by announcement year that as identified by articles from Factiva. 
Number o f parent firms is the number o f announcement spin-off parent firms during this period. Cross­
industry/ Own-industry Spin-offs is defined as whether parent firm has the same first 2-digital SIC code as 
the spin-off units. The SIC code data is obtained from the COMPUSTAT database Panel B reports the 
distribution the spin-offs sample by industry. The first two-digital SIC codes are applied to identify the 
belonged industry categories.
Panel A: The Distribution o f Spin-off Sample by Years
Year Number of Spin-offs






1980 0 0 0 0
1981 1 1 1 0
1982 0 0 0 0
1983 2 2 2 0
1984 5 5 2 3
1985 8 7 7 0
1986 7 7 6 1
1987 3 3 2 1
1988 1 2 1 2 11 1
1989 6 6 2 4
1990 9 9 9 0
1991 7 7 6 1
1992 1 2 1 2 7 5
1993 14 14 1 0 4
1994 1 0 1 0 6 4
1995 19 18 13 5
1996 19 17 1 0 7
1997 1 2 1 0 5 5
1998 17 15 9 6
1999 18 17 11 6
2 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 11 9
2 0 0 1 6 6 5 1
2 0 0 2 9 9 4 5
2003 1 0 1 0 6 4
2004 5 5 1 4
2005 7 7 5 2
2006 1 1 0 1
Grand
Total
240 230 151 79
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Panel B: The Distribution o f Spin-off Sample by Industry
Industry SIC Codes Frequency
Agricultural Production 0 1 1
Mining 1 0 , 1 2 3
Oil and Gas Extraction 13 1 0
Construction 15, 16 4
Food and Kindred Products 2 0 17
Manufacturing 21-26,29,31-34,37 43
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 17
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer 
Equipment 35 19
Electronic and Other Electronic Equipment 36 19
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments 38 19
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and 
Sanitary Services 4 0 ,4 2 ,4 5 ,4 7 6
Communications 48 1 2
Wholesale Trade 50,51 8
Retail Trade 53, 55-59 14
Services 70, 72, 75, 78-80, 82, 87 23
Business Services 73 23
Non-classifiable Establishments 99 2
Total 240
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms
Table 2.2 provides selected descriptive statistics for sample o f 240 completed spin-off deals in the period 
1980-2006. Panel A is calculated from COMPUSTAT and Compact Disclosure databases. All variables 
and ratios are calculated in the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. The market capitalization o f  
parents is the market value o f  equity o f the parent firm as the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. 
Debt/Equity is the ratio o f the book value o f total debt to the book value o f common equity. The current 
ratio is the ratio o f  current assets to current liabilities. Leverage is measured as the ratio o f long-term and 
short-term debt to book value o f assets. Operating income/ Total assets is defined as sales minus the cost o f  
good sold, sales and general administration, and working capital change, divided by the book value of 
assets. ROA is the ratio o f income before extraordinary items to the book value o f  assets. ROE is the ratio 
of income before extraordinary items to the book value o f common equity. The number o f segments is 
obtained from the COMPUSTAT segment database and is the number o f business segment o f parent firms 
in the fiscal year prior to announcement year. The sales-based Herfindahl index calculated across n 
business segments as the sum o f the squares o f each segment's sales as a proportion o f total sales o f parent 
firms in the fiscal year prior to announcement year. The M/B ratio o f  parent firms is the ratio o f market 
equity at the end o f December divided by the book common equity.
In Panel B, the transaction value and days to completion are from the SDC database. The transaction value 
is the market value o f spun-off subsidiaries at the end o f the first trading day. Days to completion is the 
number of days between announcement and effective date. Spin-off size is the ratio o f transaction value to 
the market value o f  parent firm one day prior to effective day.
Panel A: Selected characteristics of parent firms prior to spin-offs
Parent Firms
Mean Median Std. Dev
Sales($MM) 5536.85 1500.65 13995.57
Total Assets ($MM) 7266.52 1800.15 23305.93
Net Income($MM) 271.4595 42.7500 1396.97
Market Capitalization($MM) 24215.33 3497.69 75955.46
Debt /Equity 1.7753 1.3513 2.4132
Current Ratio (%) 207.311 161.1634 214.0722
Leverage (%) 26.0867 25.7025 17.0723
ROA (%) 2.3453 3.6084 10.2314
ROE (%) 7.4877 11.4431 31.8087
Number o f Segments 3.0793 3.0000 1.6010
Sales-based Herfindahl 0.6114 0.5359 0.2776
Market to Book Ratio (M/B) 2.9543 2.0575 3.4733
Panel B: Deal characteristics
Mean Median Std. Dev
Transaction Value ($MM) 1094.30 231.30 2822.67
Spin-off Size (%) 29.8825 15.2772 49.9900
Days to Completion 203.0417 195.50000 135.2128
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms Based on Positive/Negative
Abnormal Accruals
Table 2.3 provides selected descriptive statistics for sample o f  240 completed spin-off deals in the period 
1980-2006. based on positive/negative abnormal accruals (Residual_MJ) which is estimated by Modified- 
Jones Model. Panel A is calculated from COMPUSTAT and Compact Disclosure databases. All variables 
and ratios are calculated in the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. The market capitalization of 
parents is the market value o f equity o f  the parent firm as the fiscal year end prior to the announcement year. 
Debt/Equity is the ratio o f  the book value o f total debt to the book value o f common equity. The current 
ratio is the ratio o f  current assets to current liabilities. Leverage is measured as the ratio o f long-term and 
short-term debt to book value o f assets. Operating income/ Total assets is defined as sales minus the cost o f  
good sold, sales and general administration, and working capital change, divided by the book value of 
assets. ROA is the ratio o f  income before extraordinary items to the book value o f assets. ROE is the ratio 
of income before extraordinary items to the book value o f common equity. The number o f segments is 
obtained from the COMPUSTAT segment database and is the number o f business segment o f parent firms 
in the fiscal year prior to announcement year. The sales-based Herfindahl index calculated across n 
business segments as the sum o f the squares of each segment's sales as a proportion of total sales o f parent 
firms in the fiscal year prior to announcement year. The M/B ratio o f parent firms is the ratio o f  market 
equity at the end o f December divided by the book common equity. The nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test for means difference is conducted and the two tail p-values are reported in parentheses.
Positive Negative Difference (Positive-Negative)







Sales($MM) 4684.55 1921.60 115 6320.96 1008.27 125 -1636.41 913.33 0.134
Total Assets ($MM) 4908.54 1944 115 9435.86 1579.5 125 -4527 364.61 0.577
Net Income($MM) 294.787 111.10 115 236.04 17.73 125 58.749 94.17 <0.0001
Market Capitalization(SMM) 18771.2 3056.10 115 29132.5 3937.67 125 -10361.3 -881.57 0.603
Debt /Equity 1.7339554 1.307 115 1.81371 1.3815 125 -0.08 -0.0742 0.822
Current Ratio (%) 202.97185 178.4 115 211.362 155.99 125 -84.0012 22.423 0.189
Leverage (%) 26.1467557 24.84 115 26.0311 26.348 125 0.1156 -1.5083 0.889
Operation Income/ Total 
Assets (%)
14.2894604 15.62 115 11.9465 12.178 125 2.343 3.43911 0.004
ROA (%) 4.1403874 4.81 115 0.69395 2.3203 125 3.4464 2.49001 <0.0001
ROE (%) 14.1617364 14.52 115 1.34767 7.2973 125 12.814 7.22258 <0.0001
Number of Segments 2.8684211 3 115 2.97581 3 125 -0.107 0 0.996
Sales-based Herfindahl 0.6079914 0.53 115 0.61459 0.5696 125 -0.007 -0.0397 0.926
Market to Book Ratio (M/B) 2.962185 2.114589 115 2.94726 2.007762 125 0.0149 0.1058 0.505
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Table 2.4: Abnormal Returns around Spin-offs Announcements and Long Term 
Returns for Sample Parent Firms
Panel A reports cumulative abnormal returns over selected intervals for a sample of 240 firms that 
completed spin-offs during the period 1980-2006. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model 
parameters estimated over a 255-day period ending 5 days (Day -5) before the announcement date (Day 0). 
The CRSP value- weighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are 
cumulated in the intervals. The percentage positive is the ratio o f the number o f firms with positive 
abnormal returns to the total number o f firms.
Panel B reports buy-and-hold raw returns and abnormal long-term returns after spin-offs announcements. 
Monthly windows up to twelve, twenty-four and thirty-six months after spin-offs announcements are 
employed to estimate long-run abnormal stock returns. The estimated period is over a 60 month period 
ending 13 months prior to the announcement day. The control firm method suggested by Barber and Lyon 
(1997) to estimate buy-and-hold (BHARs) long-term abnormal returns is applied. The long-run abnormal 
return is the difference between the raw return o f a sample spin-offs firm and the raw return o f a matched 
firm. The matched firm is the firm that has the same four-digit SIC codes as the parent sample and the 
market value is between 80% and 1 2 0 % of the market value o f the sample firm at the end o f announcement 
year t -  1. The generalized sign test is used to test the significance o f the percentage o f firms with positive 
abnormal returns.
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around Spin-offs Announcements
Interval Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(Days) Mean t-statistic Median Percentage Positive
-30 to - 6 -0.35% -0.322 -0.78% 48.33%
-5 to -1 1.17% 2.403** -0 .0 1 % 50.00%
- 1  toO 2.53% 7 714*** 1.95% 70.42%***
0 1.90% 8.676*** 1.34% 65.42%***
0 to + l 3.27% 8.647*** 2 .6 8 % 70.00%***
+1 to +5 0.56% 1.146 -0.06% 49.57%
+ 6  to +30 -1.29% -1.182 -1.25% 41.67%*
















+ 1  to + 1 2 0.85%* 0 .8 6 % 52.5%*** 0.24% -0.62%
+1 to +24 1.63%** 1.61% 57.5%*** 0.40% 0.57%
+1 to +36 2.74%*** 1.74% 53.75%*** -0.69% -0.18%
0 to +36 4.84%*** 3.84% 57.5%*** 1 .1 0 % 1.08%
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%








5  Table 2.5: Parent Firms’ Abnormal Accruals Before and After Spin-offs
°  Table 2.5 reports the means and the medians of abnormal accruals o f spin-offs parents firms during 1980-2006. Abnormal accruals of parent firms three years prior to spin-offs
5  announcement year (t) and three years after spin-offs completion year (e) are reported. Abnormal accruals are proxies by Residual_J, Residual MJ, and TACCJD. Residuals_J is
^ calculated as the residuals o f the Jones Model; Residual_MJ is the residuals of the Modified Jones Model; and TACCJD is the industrial-adjusted total accruals. It is measured as
§  the total scaled accruals o f parent firms subtract the median of total scaled accruals o f relevant industry. The median of total scaled accruals of relevant industry are calculated as
;o the median of total scaled accruals for all firms (exclude sample firms) in the same industry (the same first 2-digital SIC codes) during the same period. The positive/ negative
a. abnormal accruals are defined as the positive/negative number in Residual_J, Residuals_MJ and TACCJD. Panel A reports the means and medians of abnormal accruals o f all
“  parents before and after spin-offs. Panel B reports the means and medians of abnormal accruals of parents firms based on positive/ negative Residual_J; Panel C reports the means
and medians of abnormal accruals o f parents firms based on positive/ negative Residual_MJ, and Panel D reports the means and medians o f abnormal accruals o f parents based on 
< positive/ negative TACCJD. The p-values are the two-tailed, Student’s t-test about the null hypothesis that the means are not significantly different from zero.
Panel A: Abnormal Accruals o f Parent Firms Before and After Spin-offs
Further r
Year Abnormal Accruals (ResidualJ) Abnormal Accruals (Residual_MJ) Abnormal Accruals (TACCJD)
Mean Median p-value N of Obs Mean Median p-value N of Obs Mean Median p-value N o f Obs
CD
■ o t-3 0.00812 0.0010 0.4049 237 0.0073 -0.0010 0.4464 237 -0.0123 -0.01239 0.6144 238
Q .
C t-2 -0.00672 -0.0067 0.3411 238 -0.00672 -0.0084 0.3427 237 -0.0128 -0.01282 0.1030 240
S
o ' t-1 -0.00370 -0.0042 0.6744 240 -0.00367 -0.0030 0.6797 240 -0.0147 -0.01472 0.1043 240
" O
—5
e+1 -0.01050 0.0119 0.5227 231 -0.0099 0.0080 0.5290 231 -0.0516 -0.01278 0.0124 197
3 -
CT e+2 -0.00803 -0.0098 0.1096 205 -0.0082 -0.0097 0.1077 205 0.0092 -0.0030 0.1644 182
CD
Q .




Panel B: Positive/ Negative Abnormal Accruals of Parent Firms Before and After Spin-offs Based on the Modified Jones Model
" O
CD
Year Abnormal Positive Accruals (ResiduaI_MJ) Abnormal Negative Accruals (Residual_MJ)
3 Mean Median p-value N o f Obs Mean Median p-value N of Obs
0)
o' t-3 0.0096637 0.0042918 0.5112 113 0.005832 -0.008477 0.6573 123
t-2 0.0103261 0.0036396 0.3177 113 -0.022883 -0.018117 0.0208 123
t-1 0.0667467 0.0368545 <0.0001 113 -0.069122 -0.032161 <0.0001 123
e+1 -0.021053 0.0197842 0.4915 109 0.0018142 -0.000028 0.8802 117












Table 2.5: Parent Firms’ Abnormal Accruals Before and After Spin-offs -cont’
Table 2.5 reports the means and the medians of abnormal accruals o f spin-offs parents firms during 1980-2006. Abnormal accruals o f  parent firms three years prior to spin-offs 
announcement year (t) and three years after spin-offs completion year (e) are reported. Abnormal accruals are proxies by ResidualJ, ResidualJMJ, and TACC_D. Residuals J  is 
calculated as the residuals of the Jones Model; Residual_MJ is the residuals of the Modified Jones Model; and TACC_D is the industrial-adjusted total accruals. It is measured as 
the total scaled accruals o f parent firms subtract the median of total scaled accruals o f relevant industry. The median o f total scaled accruals of relevant industry are calculated as 
the median o f totol scaled accruals for all firms (exclude sample firms) in the same industry (the same first 2-digital SIC codes) during the same period. The positive/ negative 
abnormal accruals are defined as the positive/negative number in Residual_J, Residuals_MJ and TACC_D. Panel A reports the means and medians of abnormal accruals o f  all 
parents before and after spin-offs. Panel B reports the means and medians of abnormal accruals of parents firms based on positive/ negative Residual J; Panel C reports the means 
and medians o f abnormal accruals of parents firms based on positive/ negative Residual_MJ, and Panel D reports the means and medians of abnormal accruals o f parents based on 
positive/ negative TACC_D. The p-values are the two-tailed, Student’s t-test about the null hypothesis that the means are not significantly different from zero.
Panel C: Positive/ Negative Abnormal Accruals of Parent Firms Before and After Spin-offs Based on the Jones Model
Year Abnormal Positive Accruals (ResidualJ) Abnormal Negative Accruals (Residual J)
Mean Median p-value N  o f Obs Mean Median p-value N o f  Obs
t-3 0.0083 -0.0055 0.3142 1 1 0 0.0085 -0.0062 0.3142 126
t- 2 0.0104 0 . 0 0 2 1 0.6044 1 1 0 -0.0667 -0.0349 0.0253 126
t- 1 0.0697 0.0389 <0 . 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 -0.0218 -0.0156 <0 . 0 0 0 1 126
e+ 1 -0.0272 0.0237 0.4136 105 0.0056 0.6244 0.6244 127
e+ 2 -0.0070 -0.0041 0.2878 94 -0.0078 0.3057 0.3057 107
e+3 -0.0015 -0.0080 0.8196 8 8 -0.0194 0.0426 0.0426 1 0 1
Panel D: Positive/ Negative Abnormal Accruals o f Parent Firms Before and After Spin-offs Based on the Industrial-adjusted Total Accruals
Year Abnormal Positive Accruals (TACCJD) Abnormal Negative Accruals (TACCJD)
Mean Median p-value N  o f Obs Mean Median p-value N  o f Obs
t-3 -0.004696 0.0043174 0.8327 91 -0.007625 -0.02146 0.5177 145
t- 2 0.0154565 0.0041329 0.2236 91 -0.029499 -0.033251 0.0005 147
t- 1 0.0649626 0.0402843 <0 . 0 0 0 1 91 -0.064251 -0.039891 <0 .0 0 0 1 151
e+ 1 -0.105961 -0.008876 0.0715 67 -0.024131 -0.015649 0.0025 129
e+ 2 0.0108797 0.0038968 0.2596 62 0.009257 -0.009314 0.2977 119












Table 2.6: Abnormal Returns around Spin-offs Announcements for Sample Parent Firms Based on Positive/ Negative
Abnormal Accruals
Table 2.6 reports cumulative abnormal returns over selected intervals for sample firms that completed spin-offs during the period 1980-2006, based on 
positive/negative abnormal accruals. The abnormal accruals (ResidualM Jl) in panel A is estimated by the residuals o f  Jones Model. The abnormal accruals 
(Residual J) in Panel B are estimated by the residuals o f  Modified-Jones Model. The industry-adjusted total accruals in Panel C are calculated as the total 
accruals o f  sample parent firms minus the medians o f  total accruals o f  relevant industry o f  parent firms. All the abnormal returns in table 2.6 are calculated using 
the market model parameters estimated over a 255-day period ending 5 days before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the 
market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are cumulated in the intervals. The percentage positive is the ratio o f the number o f firms with positive 
abnormal returns to the total number o f  firms. The generalized sign test is used to test the significance o f  the percentage o f  firms with positive abnormal returns. 
The nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for means difference is reported. The two tail / 7-values are reported in parentheses. Respectively, *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents with Positive /  Abnormal Accruals Based on Modified-Jones Models
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents with Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents with
Interval








t-statistic Median % Percentage
Positive
Mean D iff (%)
OM2)
-30 to - 6 -0.96 -0.682 -0.29 49.6% 0 . 2 1 0.118 -1.14 47.2%
-1.17
(0.880)
-5 to -1 1.13 1.801* -0.04 45.1% 1 .2 1 1.56 0.03 51.2% -0.08
(0.766)
- 1  to 0 2.31 5.805*** 1.94 69.6%*** 2.73 5.550*** 2.03 71.2%*** -0.42
(0.305)
0 1.71 6.085*** 1,71 62.6%*** 2.07 5.946*** 1.69 6 8 %***
-0.36
(0.192)
- 1  to + 1 2 . 6 8 5.513*** 2.25 62.6%*** 3.82 6.336*** 3.74 70.4%*** -1.14
(0 .2 0 1 )
+1 to +5 -0.58 -0.924 -0.38 45.2% 1.61 2.070** 0.73 53.6% -2.19
(0.14)














Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents with Positive / Abnormal Accruals Based on Jones Models
Interval
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents with Positive 
Abnormal Accruals (Residual_J) N =II0
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents with 
Negative Abnormal Accruals(Residual_J) N=130





-30 to -6 -0.83 -0.584 -0.36 49.1% 0.05 0.029 -1.06 47.7% -0.88(0.980)
-5 to -1 1.09 1.721* -0.03 49.1% 1.25 1.668 0.02 50.8% -0.16(0.659)
-1 to 0 2.26 5.642*** 1.85 68.2%*** 2.76 6.639*** 2.14 67.7%*** -0.5(0.210)
0 1.80 6.368*** 1.11 61.8%*** 1.98 5.912*** 1.73 68.5%*** -0.18(0.261)
-1 to +1 2.51 5.127*** 1.90 69.1%*** 3.92 6.765*** 3.77 70.7%*** -1.41(0.108)
+1 to +5 -0.61 -2.595 -0.38 47.2% 1.55 2.075** 0.52 51.5% -2.16(0.1502)
+6 to +30 -3.67 -2.595*** -1.36 35.5%** 0.72 0.430 -0.52 47.9% -4.39(0.047)
Panel C: C um ulative Abnorm al R eturns for Sam ple Parents w ith Positive /  Abnorm al A ccruals Based on the Industry-Adjusted T otal Accruals
Interval
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents with Positive 
Abnormal Accruals (TACC_D>0) N=90
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Sample Parents with 
Negative Abnormal Accruals(TACC_D<0) N=150
Mean%
(1)




Mean Diff (%) 
(l)-(2)
-30 to -6 -0.91 -0.553 0.44 50.5% -0.17 -0.115 -0.93 47% -0.74(0.6105)
-5 to -1 1.58 2.148** 0.31 51.6% 1.08 1.634 -0.04 49% 0.5(0.7938)
-1 toO 2.24 4.796*** 2.12 64.8%*** 2.70 6.497*** 1.81 73.5%*** -0.46(0.6305)
0 1.31 3.978*** 0.38 58.2%*** 2.28 7.722*** 1.66 70.2%*** -0.97(0.1283)
-1 to +1 2.40 4.199*** 2.12 68.1%*** 3.78 7.403*** 3.36 70.9%*** -1.38(0.6306)
+1 to +5 -0.61 -2.595 -0.38 47.20% 1.01 2.523 0.03 50.3% -1.62(0.4944)











Table 2.7: The Degree of Abnormal Accruals of Sample Parent Firms and Announced Abnormal Returns
This table reports the abnormal returns for a sample firms with positive abnormal accruals that completed a spin-off in the period 1980-2006, sorted based on the 
level o f  abnormal accruals (Residual MJ) at the end o f fiscal year prior to the announcement year Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model 
parameters estimated over a 255-day period ending 5 days before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to 
compute betas. The abnormal returns are the cumulative abnormal returns measured over the interval (-1, 0), (0, 0), (-1, 1), and (+6 , +30). N  represents the 
number o f observations in each category. The results o f the t-statistics for the difference in the mean abnormal returns between the relevant groups, and the 








Q 4 -Q 1
Residual_MJ
(-1 ,0 ) Mean 2.95% 1.45% 1.64% 3.20% 0.25%
Median 2.98% 0.64% 1.13% 3.01% 0.3%
N 28 29 29 29
(0 ,0 ) Mean 1.94% 1.26% 1.45% 2.19% 0.25%
Median 1.18% 0 .6 6 % 2.17 % 1.33% 0.15%
N 28 29 29 29
(- 1 , 1 ) Mean 3.00% 1.28% 2.24% 4.22% 1 .2 2 %*
Median 2.45% 0.58% 2.97% 2.63% 0.18%
N 28 29 29 29
(+6 , +30) Mean -8.95% -2.99% -1.40% - 1 .1 0 % 7.85%**
Median -5.23% -1.49% -1.06% 0.32% 5.55%**
N 28 29 29 29











Table 2.8: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Announcement Returns on Positive Pre-spin-offs Abnormal Accruals
This table reports the abnormal announcement returns on abnormal accruals for a pre-spin-offs positive abnormal accruals sample that completed a spin-off in die period 1980-2006. The dependent 
variable is the mean three-day cumulative abnormal return generated over the interval (-1, +1). The cumulative abnormal return around the spin-off announcement of parent firms are calculated by using 
the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) with the CRSP value- weighted index as the benchmark of the market portfolio. The estimated period is over a 255 trading day period ending 5 trading days 
prior to the announcement day. All the independent variables applied in Aose regressions are calculated from Ae annual date at Ae end of fiscal year prior to Ae spin-offs announcement year. The 
Residual_MJ is Ae residuals from Ae estimation of Ae Modified-Jones Model, Residual_J is Ae residuals from Ae estimation of Ae Jones Model, and the TACC_D is defined as Ae total accruals of 
parent firms subtract the median total accruals of relevant mdustry (which has the same first two-digital SIC-code as parent firms) during Ae same periods. D/E is Ae ratio of Ae book value o f total debt 
to Ae book value of common equity. HERFINDAHL is Ae sales-based Herfindahl index which is calculated across n business segments as Ae sum of Ae squares of each segment's sales as a proportion 
of total sales of parent firms in the fiscal year prior to announcement year. TMB is Ae pre-spin-off M/B ratio of spun-off subsiAaries which is defined as Ae ratio of Ae estimated market equity in 
announcement year t - 1 ,  divided by Ae book common equity for Ae fiscal year ending m announcement year t -  l.The estimated market equity of spun-off subsidiaries is equal to Ae spun-off 
subsidiary’s accounting sale multiplied by its matchmg specified-firm industry median ratio o f capital to accounting sale minus its book value of debt ERROR is Ae forecast errors which measure in Ae 
last month of Ae fiscal year before Ae announcement of Ae spin-off. They are defined as Ae ratio of Ae absolute value of Ae difference between Ae actual eammgs and Ae forecast earnmgs to Ae 
price per share at Ae beginnmg of Ae monA. Leverage is measured as Ae ratio of long-term and short-term debt to book value of assets. ROA is Ae ratio of income before extraordinary items to Ae 
book value of assets. M/B is Ae pre-spm-off market-to-book ratio of parent firms which is calculated by market equity at Ae end of December of announcement year t-1 divided by Ae book common 
equity for Ae fiscal year t-1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parenAeses. Respectively, * , ** and *** denote statistical significance at Ae 10%, 5% and 1% level.






































































































































F  Statistics 2.599 ** 2.333 ** 2.072 ** 1.88 ** 2.116** 2.273 * 2.441 ** 2.383 ** 2.807 **
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.124 0.115 0.099 0.109 0.107 0.181 0.157 0.173
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Table 2.9: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Long-term Returns on Positive Pre-spin­
offs Abnormal Accruals
This table reports the long-term returns after spin-offs announcements on abnormal accruals for a pre-spin-offs positive 
abnormal accruals sample that completed a spin-off in the period 1980-2006. The dependent variable is the mean one- 
year (+1, +12) buy-and-hold raw returns after the announcement month. All the independent variables applied in those 
regressions are calculated from the annual data at the end of fiscal year prior to the spin-offs announcement year. The 
Residual_MJ is the residuals from the estimation of the Modified-Jones Model, Residual_J is the residuals from the 
estimation of the Jones Model, and the TACC_D is defined as the total accruals of parent firms subtract the median 
total accruals o f relevant industry (which has the same first two-digital SIC-code as parent firms) during the same 
periods. HERFINDAHL is the sales-based Herfindahl index which is calculated across n business segments as the sum 
of the squares o f each segment's sales as a proportion of total sales o f parent firms in the fiscal year prior to 
announcement year. GROWTH is the median long term earnings growth rate which is predicated by financial analysts 
in the last month o f the fiscal year before the announcement of the spin-off INST is the institutional ownership which 
is calculated by the shares held by institutional shareholders divided by the total outstanding common stock shares in 
the last month of the fiscal year before the announcement o f the spin-off. D/E is the ratio o f the book value o f total debt 
to the book value of common equity. M/B is the pre-spin-off market-to-book ratio of parent firms which is calculated 
by market equity at the end of December of announcement year t-1 divided by the book common equity for the fiscal 
year t-1. ERROR is the forecast errors which measure in the last month o f the fiscal year before the announcement o f  
the spin-off. They are defined as the ratio o f the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings and the 
forecast earnings to the price per share at the beginning o f the month. NUMBERS is the number o f the financial 
analysts issuing long-term earnings forecast for the firm in the last month of the fiscal year prior to spin-offs. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. Respectively, ♦, ** and *♦* denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level.










(-1.752) ♦♦ (-1.774)** (-1.324)*
0.002 0.002 0.000
(1.601) * (1.124) (0.228)
0.110 0.103 0.099































***Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% ’ Significant at 10%
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